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ABSTRACT
China’s economic reforms, which started in the industrial sector during 1978, have to 
a greater extent changed the way in which state-owned industrial enterprises (SOEs) 
were managed. SOEs are given more and more autonomous powers with respect to 
their production. Among various autonomous powers is the power to enter into 
technological collaboration agreements with foreign technology suppliers. What is 
SOEs’ technological behaviour in terms of choosing foreign technology? What is the 
relationship between technology transfer and SOEs’ own technological effort? Does 
technology transfer discourage or encourage SOEs’ own technological effort?
This study has examined the above questions with reference to the experience 
of SOEs in China’s machine-building industry. Based on a questionnaire survey, it 
was found that the main reasons for SOEs obtaining foreign technologies are the 
unavailability, immaturity and low quality of local technologies. The criteria for 
choosing between foreign technologies are their advanced stage, suitability and the 
reputation of technology suppliers. Logit analyses showed that the probability that an 
SOE stresses the unavailability factor increases with enterprise size. Multiple 
regression analyses suggested that technology imports, enterprise size and multi­
product production have a positive effect on in-house technological effort, which is 
measured by both research and development expenditures and patent statistics. 
However, larger SOEs were found to be less responsive to market signals for new 
technology.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Over the last two decades China witnessed a great surge of imports of technology 
from economically advanced and less advanced countries. A total of 305,873 
technology agreements and contracts, worth US$6540.01 billion, was signed; this was 
more than eight times greater than in the previous thirty years. The increased demand 
for those imports was a direct product of the economic reforms, aimed at transforming 
an over-rigid command economy into a market-oriented economy. The inflow of 
technology has had, and will continue to have, far-reaching effects on various aspects 
of China's economic activity and technological development.
The present study is mainly concerned with the inter-relationship between 
technology transfer and the technological behaviour of China's state-owned industrial 
enterprises (hereinafter SOEs), with particular reference to the machine-building 
enterprises.
1.1 Chinese Economic Reforms: An Institutional Framework for the Study
Encouraged by the alleged success with rural economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
characterised by decollectivization and the popularisation of the family contract 
system^ and by the experience gained from experimental industrial reforms in some 
selected SOEs in the early 1980s ,^ the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a
 ^ Decollectivization was carried out in the form of "household contract system" under which the 
production team contracts out its arable land, together with farming facilities and links farmers' income 
to their output. It seems that the system was and remained successful at the beginning and throughout 
most of the 1980s. However, with more and more lOUs issued to farmers instead of cash payments, 
farmers became angry and farmers' riots were reported. More and more farmers returned all or part of 
the land they contracted in when their contracts expired, giving rise to the question that if  the alleged 
success in China's rural economic reforms is sustainable. Or it may be just a short-lived one which may 
not survive in the long-run (for more information on China's rural reforms, see Yamamoto, 1983; Van, 
1982; Chossudovsky, 1986; Ottsuka and Hayami, 1992; Puttrman, 1993; Zhou, 1994; and Liu, Carter 
and Yao, 1998).
2 The Chinese industrial reforms date back to October 1978 and in 1979 when experimental industrial 
reforms were conducted in more than 100 selected enterprises with respect to their production, supply, 
marketing, personnel management, finance, labour and wages, and so on. By 1980, the number of 
enterprises in which the reforms were carried out reached 6,600. In 1984, on the basis of this prior 
experiment, the State Council issued a formal document - Provisional Regulations on the Further 
Enlargement of Autonomy of State-owned Enterprises, further expending the power of state-owned 
enterprises (for detailed description and studies of Chinese industrial reforms, see Xue Muqiao, 1980; 
Ma Hong, 1983; William A. Byrd, 1983; Chossudovsky, 1986).
resolution at the 3rd Session of its 12th Central Committee on October 20, 1984  ^
aimed at extending the urban economic reforms to all parts of China. Consequently, 
the second half of the 1980s witnessed a series of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
reforms. At the macro level, the essence of the reforms is that the government has 
begun to use 'economic levers', which correspond more or less to fiscal and monetary 
policies used in the Western world. At the micro level, the main change was the 
decentralisation of decision making; SOEs were freed from centrally planned controls. 
However, on the political front the socialist centrally planned economy was still 
considered to be the main form of the economic system; the market forces, introduced 
by the various reforms, were expected to play a complementary role to the socialist 
planning.
The Chinese economic reforms have been widely studied by both Chinese and 
foreign experts' .^ As put by William A. Byrd (1992), 'the history of Chinese industrial 
reform since the late 1970s is a plethora of measures, implemented amid evolving 
economic behaviour and institutions'; and as a result, a ' highly imperfect, 
administratively restrictive market' has emerged, juxtaposed along with the lingering 
of central plans (William A. Byrd, 1992, p.2).
It seems that a compromise had been made between reformists and 
conservatives^ within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the eve of the 14th
 ^ For the English version of this document, titled, "Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on Reforms of the Economic Structure", see the appendix in the book, 
Progess in Urban Reform (Beijing, China: Bejing Review, 1987), pp. 113 -150.
"^ Studies on China's urban economic reforms are well documented in both Chinese and English. For 
studies documented in Chinese, see a five-volume collection of economic studies by more than thirty 
China's most famous economists such as Yu Guangyuan, 1992; Ma Hong, 1992; Li Yining, 1992; to 
list just a few. A very detailed case study on China's industrial reforms described almost all aspects of 
the reforms at the microlevel(Byrd, 1992). Other studies in English are Gorden White, 1988; Francois 
Gipouloux, 1988; Martin Lockett, 1988; William A. Byrd, 1987a, 1987b, 1991; William A. Byrd and 
Gene Tidrick, 1987; Dwight H. Perkins, 1988; Gene Tidrick and Chen Jiyan, 1987.
^Chinese economic reforms are considered as a struggle between reformists, headed by Deng Xiao­
ping, and conservatives, headed by Chen Yun. The former advocates the substitution o f market 
mechanisms for central economic planning as the only way of managing China's economy. The 
stmggle between reformists and conservatives on the issue of establishing socialist market economy is 
well discussed by Liu Yanzi (1992).
CCP National Congress^ at which the slogan, 'establishing socialist market economy' 
was adopted' .^ It is now very likely that the industrial reforms will be continued on a 
broad front, against a new policy background.
The reforms are firmly supported by a quasi-legal document - the Regulations 
on the Transfer of Operational Mechanisms of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises ( 
hereinafter the Regulations) - promulgated by the central government in 1992. In 
1993, the above slogan was written into China's constitution at the 8th National 
People's Congress^ to show CCP's determination to further deepen industrial reforms. 
In fact, the 1992 Regulations are nothing more than the detailed explanation of the 
Enterprise Law.^ Its main points are as follows,
(1) To rationalise the relationship between the government and SOEs, the 
SOEs are authorised to possess, utilise, and dispose of public property, according to 
the law, and no other organisations such as government departments could treat the 
public property as such. On the basis of public ownership, SOEs adopt one of three 
types of relationships between themselves and government: a contractual 
responsibility system^^, separation of profits and taxes^  ^ and a share holding system^^
^The 14th CCP National Congress in October, 1992 represented a victory of reformists over 
conservatives and laid a firm foundation for China's market-oriented economic reforms in the 1990s. 
^Some reformist economists have gone so far that they suggest that the word "socialist" be substituted 
by the word "modem" . Although die slogan itself was remained unchanged at the 14th CCP National 
Congress, it was obvious that the word "socialist" as a modifier had lost its significance. For details, 
see Liu Yanzi (1992).
^The 8th National People's Congress was opened in early 1993.
^The Chinese Enterprise Law was enacted at the 7th National People's Congress in April, 1988.
®^For the discussion on contractual responsibility system in various forms, see Huang Yuguang, 1990; 
Wang Deshen and Cui Yanqiu, 1990; Wang Xuncheng and Qu Desheng, 1990; Yang Peixin, 1991; 
Wang Zhongyu, 1991; Yang Ping, 1991; Qiu Enyi, 1991; Li Zhongfan, 1991; Yang Peiming, et al, 
1991; Xiao Feng, 1991; Yang Peixin, 1991.
^^ For the discussion on the separation of profits and taxes, see Li Kaiwang, 1990; Huang Yun, 1990; 
Chen Yinya, 1991; Wang Shuenhua, 1991; Zhang Yanning, 1992.
^^ For the government regulations concerning the experimental shareholding system in the state 
enterprises, see the State Planning Committee and the State Committee for Economic Stmcture 
Reform, 1992; the Minstry of Labour and the State Committee for Economic Structure Reform, 1992; 
the Minstry of Finance and the State Council, 1992; the State Auditing Office and the State Committee 
for Economic Stmcture Reform, 1992. For discussion on problems facing enterprises experimenting 
with shareholding system, see Zeng Weirong, 1992; Tang Xu, 1992; Liao Pin, 1992. For some 
suggestions about how to reform Chinese enterprises by means of shareholding system, see Li Yining,
Through the rationalisation and consolidation of these distributional relationships, 
SOEs are expected to become economic entities independent of any government 
agencies.
(2) The Regulations stress the role that markets should play in influencing 
SOEs' three major decisions, namely what to produce, how to produce, and for whom 
to produce. The state economic plans will still play a role in SOEs' long run decisions. 
However, these enterprises may now purchase their factors, adjust their production 
mix and determine the process of some p r o d u c t s ^ ^
(3) SOEs are now authorised to import and export. This marks the end of old 
foreign trade practices "^ .^ SOEs may choose their own foreign trade agents, free from 
any constraints imposed by geographical and trade conditions, negotiate with foreign 
companies, and use their retained foreign exchange earnings at their own discretion, 
free from restrictions imposed by foreign exchange limits of the state plan. SOEs also 
have a freehand to actively pursue technological collaboration with foreign 
counterparts^^.
(4) To help transfer investment decisions from the state to SOEs, the 
Regulations stipulate that SOEs could use their retained profits to purchase 
equipment, land, industrial property, unpatented technology, etc. A SOE may invest in 
the trades of other SOEs, collectively owned enterprises (COEs), Sino-foreign joint
1992; Shi Suchao, 1992; Suen Liangxiao, 1992; Huang Zhen and Ling Jianghui, 1991; Li Yining, 
1992; Zhang Chengyao, 1992; Wang Honglin and Zhuang Jianhua, 1992.
 ^^ According to a report of China Daily (1992) , China has opened more than 10,000 markets for capital 
goods, real estates, finance, labour and information. Rapidly developed factor markets have stimulated 
the national economy. For example, the Shanghai Non-ferrous Metal Exchange has concluded 
transactions totalling Y117 billion yuan (US$20.5 billion) in the first 10 months since it opened for 
business in May 1992. About 1000 financial markets have issued about Y500 billion yuan (US$87.7 
billion) in stocks and bonds, helping introduce market mechanisms into finance and break the tightly 
controlled credit system.
A brief treatment of traditional Chinese foreign trade regime - its formation, evolutionand reforms 
after 1978 - was given by Richard Pomfret (1991) ; a most detailed description and examination of the 
same subject is seen in Nicholars R, Lardy (1992); and a specific case study on China's foreign trade 
reforms is published in the World Economy (Arvind Panagariya, 1993).
^^ For details, see the No. 103 directive of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1992.
ventures (JVs) and wholly foreign-owned ventures (WFOs) inside or outside China. 
And to encourage their research and development (R&D) effort, SOEs enjoy 
preferential tax treatment, for example, partial refund of taxes and accelerated 
depreciation^ 6.
(5) Restrictions on retained profits in certain activities were abolished. The 
Regulations stipulate that, given the guaranteed increase in the value of their assets, 
SOEs now have the right to distribute their retained profits among various uses, in the 
proportion they think proper. The retained profits can also be combined with other 
fimds to conduct technological transformation, R&D, etc.^ '^ ’
(6) SOEs can also dispose of unwanted, or surplus fixed assets by lending, 
mortgaging and/or selling them, provided that the incomes are used for production 
and R&D19.
(7) The government will no longer directly allocate human resources. SOEs 
now have right to decide when to engage employees, how many to employ, for what 
purpose and also the qualifications required of an applicant. The government is
The comprehensive depreciation rate, which is applied to all types of industrial fixed assets, was low 
from 1953 to 1982 and the change of it was negligible over the same period. Major readjustment of the 
rate by differentiating the types of fixed assets and taking into consideration technological progress 
was not seen in industrial enterprises nationwide until 1985. Low depreciation rate is still a big 
problem that causes a great concern of enterprises in the 1990s since depreciation fund, whose amount 
is determined by depreciation rate, is an important source of R&D funds for enterprises.
^^ The tight control over the use of retained profits imposed by the central government was justified by 
the behaviour peculiar to state-owned enterprises under "soft budget constraints" ( Janos Komai, 
1984). Under these circumstances, enterprises are maximizing workers' welfare in the forms of 
increasing wages, overtime pay, bonuses of various kinds, expenditures on other welfare facilities such 
as housing, nursery school, etc. but not their profits. Some of published statistics show that a great 
number of enterprises violated the 60:40 official ratio for using Âeir retained profits and some even to 
a great extent. Instead of using 60 per cent of retained profits for production and R&D, SOEs just used 
40 per cent; and in some extreme cases, only 20 per cent was used for production and R&D.
 ^^ Before 1979 when profit retention system came into being, the enterprise's financial needs for R&D 
was satisfied by the state budget. Since 1979, the enterprise has come to retain amount of its profits in 
order to set up, among other funds, the fund for production development which can be used together 
with other funds also set up from retained profits such as depreciation fund and overhaul fund to 
finance R&D and technological transformation.
^^ For details, see The People's Daily, 13th September, 1992, p.2.
helping the establishment of a labour market^o. SOEs also have the right to determine 
the contractual relationships with their employers, i.e. workers can be hired in the 
form of fixed-term or other types of contracts^ h This reform measure marks the end of 
the pre-reform government employment policy, characterised by its emphasis on full 
employment at low wage levels. The subsequent emergence of employee income 
maximisation as discussed by Byrd (1987) and Wu Jinglian (1993a) indicates the bias 
of SOEs’ behaviour towards profits from ahove-plan output sold at the higher free 
market prices.
(8) SOEs have been given the authority to adopt their own wage structure. 
The traditional eight-grade wage scales, that were designed by the government's 
labour and wage agencies, are to be replaced by enterprise-determined piece rates and 
hourly rates. Changes in wages are to be linked to workers' functions and skills^ .^
The regulations indicate that Chinese industrial reform has entered a new stage 
in which the viability of SOEs will be largely determined by their ability to adapt 
themselves to an evolving market, rather than by government subsidies hitherto given 
under soft budget c o n s t r a i n t s ^ ^  The reduced role of government in the supply of
2®Prior to the economic structure reforms, human resources as one of the important factors of 
production, was under government tight control in the sense that the enterprise's requirements for 
labour was met by govemment-run labour and wage agencies that assigned labour to various 
enterprises. One of the most serious inefficiency of such a labour system, it has been argued, is the 
inefficiency in the allocation of human resources which led to low morale amd low productivity. 
Economic reforms have transformed the way labour resources were allocated. It is the enterprise that 
decides its need for labour and employ workers accordingly from an evolving labour market. For 
details discussion about the reform of labour system, see He Yang,1991, p. 3.
2^According to article 17 of the Regulations, " The enterprise has the authority to decide what form of 
labour is to be used. The enterprise may adopt all-member labour contract system, i.e. it may enter into 
fixed-term or unfixed term contracts... Both the enterprise and its employees have their own rights and 
responsibilities as stipulated by contract ... the enterprise has authority to terminate a contract by 
relevent law(s) and regulations ...", see The Economic Daily, 1992, p. 1.
22for relatively comprehensive and systematic analyses of China's wage system, see Xu Songtao, et al. 
1989. For comprehensive discussion on theories and practice of linking wages to worker's skills, see 
Xu Songtao, et al., 1989; and for specific analysis, see Zeng Xianqin, 1991, pp. 12 - 15; Li Fuye and Li 
Shouzhong, 1991, pp. 5 - 6, 4; Liu Genyuan, 1991, p. 3; Li Ke, 1991, p. 16; Luan Yunping, 1991, pp. 
40 - 46.
2^For the detailed discussion about "soft budget constraints", see Janos kormai, 1979, pp. 801 - 19; 
1980a, pp. 147 - 57; 1980b; 1980c, pp. 231 -45; 1986, pp. 1697 - 1737; 1986b, pp. 3 - 30; 1987; Janos 
Komai and A. Matits, 1984, pp. 223 - 49.
planned materials, setting of state output quotas and unified purchase of SOEs' output 
by state commercial organisations, the changed market conditions in favour of 
consumers, and above all, the government deficits would have forced SOEs to be on 
their own feet. However, some Chinese and foreign scholars seem to hold a cautious 
view about the extent to which further industrial reform can be carried out without 
other complementary changes; these would include a transformation of government 
functions, the establishment of a complete system of social security and property 
ownership.
1.2 Economic Reforms and Government Technology Policies 
It can be argued that the weak role of the SOEs in the national innovation system 
before the 1980s was partly due to the way national science and technology had been 
managed and partly due to the shortage of R&D funds. And economic reforms aim at 
transforming SOEs into modem enterprises from government administrative 
appendices.
1.2.1 Chinais science and technology management system
China's science and technology management system was established in the mid- 
1950s, on the lines of the Soviet model. There was a high concentration of basic 
scientific research in the govemment-mn scientific and technological institutions, 
such as the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), while applied research and 
engineering design were undertaken in the institutes affiliated to various industrial 
ministries (Dean, 1979: 28 - 9, cf. Fan, 1984: 39, and Suttmeier, 1980b: 31). As 
discussed by Wang (1993: 97 - 9) such a system effectively weakened the links 
between scientific research and industrial production; it thus denied SOEs' access to a 
large pool of scientific knowledge, that was essential to develop and strengthen their 
R&D activities and technological capabilities, in relation to imported technologies.
These defects lead to the introduction of new measures in the 1980s and 1990s. 
They were designed to increase the research/production interface. Market incentives 
were introduced to encourage S&T institutions and SOEs to have considerable control 
over newly created institutions, e.g. consultancy companies, research-production 
associations, technology market centres and the market for R&D personnel (Wang, 
1993: 119 - 23). The latest statistics show that in 1997 the total transaction value in 
technology market was 53,137.18 million yuan, representing 200 per cent increase 
over 1991. In addition, enterprises were motivated to establish their own R&D 
departments; according to China Statistical Yearbook 1998, by the end of 1997 7732 
industrial SOEs had their own R&D departments, a 32.2 per cent of the total number 
of the medium-sized and large industrial SOEs.
1.2.2 Government funding for SOEs* R&D activities
The minor role that SOEs played in the national science and technology system was 
further weakened by their lack of R&D funds before the reforms. Under the system of 
command central planning, SOEs submitted all their profits to the governments at 
various levels, while their financial needs for, among other things, R&D were met by 
the government budgetary funds. Government development policy, highly biased 
toward the establishment of new enterprises rather than the improvement of existing 
enterprises via its investment in SOEs R&D, led to the lack of funds that SOEs 
needed for their R&D.
Economic reforms have changed the financial relationship between SOEs and 
governments. SOEs are allowed to use part of their retained profits, part of net 
depreciation funds and a certain percentage of their sales to finance their R&D 
activities. Government ‘subsidies’ to SOEs’ R&D activities are no longer in practice
in the post-reform era (Cheng Letian, 1997). However, to capture the possible lagged 
effect of old R&D funding practice, affiliation dummies are designed in this study.
1.2.3 Government policies o f  technology acquisition and employment 
To some extent China’s technology acquisition policy is not based on its 
consideration of its abundant human resource but on its preference in the most 
advanced technology and the effect that may have on its science and technology, 
economy as well as international status. Such preference resulted in the large scale 
technological collaboration with the former Soviet Union and other eastern bloc 
countries in the 1950s, the imports of technology from the western world in the 1970s 
when China launched its ‘four modernisations’ plan and its full scale open-door policy 
in the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 2).
On the other hand, the employment problem is not tackled. Governments were 
not pursuing technologies that are appropriate for abundant human resource but 
restricting the movement of rural population, which consisted of 80% of China’s total 
population before the reforms, using a very strict internal passport system. In the 
urban area, governments advocated and carried out an employment policy which was 
designed to create employment by lowering wages/salaries of people who were in 
employment. The full-employment-at-low-wages policy, therefore, created a large 
population of potential unemployed people.
In the post-reform era, the autonomy granted to SOEs in managing their 
human resource together with their autonomy in importing foreign technologies have 
aggravated the unemployment problem. The government seems to prefer the 
establishment of a better social security system and encouraging training for re­
employment to adjusting its technology policy to suite China’s resource endowment.
To sum up, the macroeconomic, microeconomic and S&T reforms have had 
three significant effects on SOEs: (a) to a large extent, SOEs have become 
independent of centrally planned control and are now sensitive to market forces and 
are responsible for all aspects of their operation; (b) SOEs are allowed direct access to 
foreign technology suppliers and (c) SOEs have become the major centres of the 
national R&D system.
1.3 China *s Machine Building Industry
This study will focus on China's machine-building industry, which consists of 
enterprises in ordinary machinery, special purpose equipment, transport equipment, 
electric equipment and machinery, electronic and telecommunications equipment, 
instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery. This choice arises because of the 
importance of the capital goods sector in a country's technological and economic 
development.
The role of a domestic capital goods sector in enhancing economic growth was 
theoretically analysed by Fel'man (1964), Mahalanobis (1953), and Raj and Sen 
(1961). More recently, Erick Baark (1991) proposed an extension of the earlier 
approaches in allowing for the increasingly important role of this sector in innovation 
and diffusion of technology. Rosenberg (1976) and Fransman (1986b) also emphasise 
the role of generation and diffusion of new technology capabilities. Various empirical 
studies on inter-industry technology flows for market economies show that in general 
the capital goods sector has been a major supplier of new technologies to non-capital 
goods sector ( Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Scherer, 1982 and 1986; Robson, 
Townsend and Pavitt, 1988).
China's machine-building industry24’25 has experienced many ups and downs 
because of the background of its socio-political conditions. The 'forced development'
the definition, see Chu-Yuan Cheng, 1971.
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in the 1950s by means of large scale transfer of technology from the former Soviet 
Union was interrupted in 1960 by the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technical personnel 
with more than 2000 sets of technical data. The sector started to recover in the mid- 
1960s, but this was stalled during the Cultural Revolution for the period 1966 - 76. 
There was, however, some importation of machine tools in this period. The sector's 
development began three years before the start of the country's economic reforms and 
has been expedited ever since^ .^ In 1997 there were 15,858 SOEs in the machine- 
building industry, representing 21.32 per cent of the total of 74,388 SOEs. Together 
they contributed 20 per cent of the total industrial output value of 2.786 billion y
There are a few earlier studies on China's machine-building industry: these 
include Shigeru Ishikawa's (1985) research based on the data released by the Institute 
of Economics of the Chinese Social Science Academy^^ and a recent case study by 
Zhang Ren-Yu (1983)^8. The radically changed circumstances since the late 1980s and 
early 1990s make it desirable to undertake further work. In particular, it is important 
to understand enterprise-level technological behaviour. The results may be of interest 
for government policy-making.
1.4 Plan o f the study
Chapter 2 outlines the pattern and growth of China's imports of technology upto 
the late 1990s and also the increasing autonomy allowed to SOEs, including 
responsibility for the choice of technology. Chapter 3 examines various aspects of the 
technological choices of SOEs. Chapter 4 looks at how foreign technology contributes
^^For a detailed study on the technological capabilities of China's capital goods sector before the PRC, 
see Shigeru Ishikawa, 1985.
2^See for example Chudnovsky and Nagao, 1983, 155 - 182).
2^See Shanghai Minzu Jiqi Gongye ( Shanghai National Machinery) which is published by Zhonghua 
Shuju in 1979 in two volumns. The study was conducted between May 1960 and July 1963 by a survey 
team of the Machinery Industry History Unit established by the First General and Electric Machinery 
Industry Bureau, Shanghai City Government and under the guidance of the Bureau of Administration 
Control of Industry and Commerce, Shanghai City Government; the first edition was published in 1966 
but was apparently not allowed to be distributed abroad. The 1970 edition is a partially revised one and 
available to foreign readers.
^^The study was prepared at the request of the UNCTAD secretariat. 47 Chinese machine-building 
enterprises were surveyed in order to learn about their technological experience in relation to imports 
of foreign technology.
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firm's product and process innovations and its technological capability. Chapter 5 
considers the relationship between firm's technological capabilities and patent laws to 
protect intellectual property. Have the SOEs’ patenting behaviour and their 
technological capabilities been affected since the mid 1980s when Chinese 
government promulgated China's first patent laws? Chapter 6 summarises the study 
and points out some of its limitations and the likely effects of any further economic 
reforms.
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Chapter 2 International Technology Transfer To China
2.1 Technology and Technology Transfer
C. Dahlman and L. Westphal (1982) define technology as a collection of physical 
processes, that transforms inputs into outputs, together with organisational 
arrangements, modes and procedures for carrying out these transformations. Thus, 
technology is the translation into practice of knowledge that is defined and 
information about physical processes. Technology transfer (TT) entails the licensing 
of technological knowledge by one enterprise to another. The latter enterprise may 
then undertake technological effort and build up its own technological capabilities.
2.2 Mechanisms of TT
In general, the mechanisms of TT can be classified into two broad categories: formal 
and informal mechanisms (F. Stewart, 1981: 70; Dahlman and Westphal, 1982: 119; 
and A. Abonyi, 1981:133). Informal TT is realised through books, journals, sales 
literature, personal contacts at meetings and conferences; the movement of trained 
people from one job to another; student's exchange, etc.  ^ This study concentrates on 
formal TT, mainly because of the availability of detailed data for the Chinese 
situation.
Formal mechanisms are sub-divided by Cooper and Sercovich (1971) between 
direct and indirect mechanisms.
(a) Direct mechanisms entail contact between personnel from the recipient enterprises 
and the suppliers of technology. These contacts would be concerned with engineering 
design and plant construction, training employees for specific projects, and 
explanation of technology embodied in the capital equipment.
^According to the latest official statistics, from 1978 to 1997 there were 130,265 people that were sent 
to other countries to study and 45,661 came back to China after graduated. See Leo. A. Orleans for the 
study of the role of Chinese students in technology transfer.
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(b) Indirect mechanisms are those where the suppliers company packages technology 
for the purchaser: these include turnkey arrangements and management contracts.
2.3 Technology Transfer to China: Modes o f Transfer
The modes of technology transfer to China have been changed dramatically since the 
economic reforms, partly because of the change of political climate and partly because 
of the development of indigenous technological capabilities.
2.3.1 Pre-reform period
Before and during the 1970s the dominating mechanism was the acquisition of 
complete plants. The purpose was 'reverse engineering' of equipment and machinery 
(Chu-Yuan Cheng, 1964 and R. Conroy, 1992: 182-3).
During this period China initiated a programme aimed at the improvement of its 
industrial technological capabilities mainly by the acquisition of foreign technical 
engineering products. During 1971 to 1978 the programme resulted in a total of 123 
contracts for turnkey plants and equipment worth approximately US$2.7 billion, 
accounting for 93 per cent of the total contract values in that period. After a temporary 
political setback during 1976 and 1977, the imports of turnkey plants and industrial 
equipment reached US$4.5 billion in 1978 .^
2.3.2 Reform period
The first decade of economic reforms, 1979 - 1989, saw a surge of technology transfer 
to China. This followed the increased autonomy in relation to the imports of 
technology and the retention of foreign exchange earnings. The central government 
enterprises' payments for technology imports were US$17.10 billion while those of 
the local governments’ enterprises amounted to US$13.10 billion.
2 The import boom was related to the revival of the ‘Four Modernisation’ programme. For details, see 
Chapter 5 in Suttmeier, 1980.
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In 1985, new regulations covering the examination and approval of technology 
import contracts^ were implemented. The main effect since then has been greater 
imports of technological know-how relative to those of equipment^. The annual 
average of technology contract value for the period 1979-84 was US$0.1973 billion 
while that for the period 1985-90 was US$0.6586, up by 233.81 per cent over the 
previous period.
Table 2.1 Technology Transfer Projects by Transfer Mechanism: 1970- 1990
Transfer Number of As a % of Values As a % of total
Mechanism Contracts total number (Billion US$) value
Licensing 1780 41.38 2.4930 9.84
Technical services 402 9.34 0.9364 3.70
Co-production 229 5.32 1.7597 6.74
Complete plant 1187 27.59 17.9014 70.68
Key equipment 704 16.36 2.2890 9.04
Total 4302 100.00 25.3257 100.00
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table from the following source. 
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990 (Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p. 80.
The number of technology contracts signed increased continuously and peaked 
in 1985, reaching 510. After 1985 the number of contracts fell mainly because of the 
1985 regulations and the Tiananman Square Event in June 1989. Table 2.1 shows data
^The 1985 regulations list the following points:
(a) Contracts for transfer or licensing-in of industrial property rights and technology know-how;
(b) Contracts for technical services on technical renovation, technology for product design 
improvement, quality control and enterprise management, etc. ;
(c) Contracts for co-production which involves the transfer of industrial property rights and technology 
know-how or licensing but exclusive of that for semi knock-dovm (SKD) or complete knock-down 
(CKD) operations and processing with supplied materials;
(d) Contracts for the supply of complete sets of equipment such as plant, workshop or production lines, 
the aim of which is to get industrial property rights and technology know-how as well as provision of 
technical services;
(e) Other contracts for the purchase of machinery, equipment, goods which involve the transfer of 
licensing-in of industrial property rights, technical know-how and provision of technical data, 
operation manuals and maintenance or services.
For the full set of the regulations, see CEN, 1985 and for criticism of the regulations, see Cao Jiarui, 
1987 and Zhao Wanji, 1986.
major problem in estimating flows of technology is that contracts are rarely purely for sales of 
technology alone. The technology content of most contracts is extremely difficult to isolate and 
measure quantitatively. Because of this it is a usual practice to use a surrogate measure, the easiest of 
which is trade in equipment and machinery which assumed to embody technology. Even with a 
comprehensive statistical reporting system as operating in OECD countries, flows of technology 
between countries can only be measured imperfectly at present. For a comprehensive summary of the 
issues involved, see B. Madeuf, 1984.
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on technology transfer for the period 1979-90 by transfer mechanism. The main form 
of technology transfer was still imports of complete plants and equipment; these 
contracts amounted to more than three quarters of the total value of all contracts.
During the period 1991 - 93 the number of technology transfer projects 
increased sharply, reaching a record high of 83,595 in 1993 with a total contract value 
of US$123.27 billion. The number of technology transfer projects dropped from 
47,646 worth US$93.76 billion in 1994 to 21,238, totalling US$61.06 billion in 1997 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 1998).
In addition to the imports of complete plants and equipment, other forms of 
acquiring foreign technology have come to play an increasingly important role, 
particularly since 1979. Examples are as follows:
(a) Export processing. Foreign firms not only help Chinese enterprises to fully use 
their industrial capacity and create employment, but also provide them with an access 
to foreign markets and, in certain cases, introduce modem technology.
(b) Compensation trade. As far as Chinese enterprises are concerned, compensation 
trade also provides them with foreign technology embodied in equipment and 
machinery.
(c) Joint ventures (JVs). A distinction has to be made between co-operative (or joint) 
production and joint equity venture. Co-operative production lies somewhere between 
compensation trade and the pure joint venture whereas joint equity venture has 
nothing to do with compensation trade. It is essentially a process of technology 
transfer in which a foreign partner helps its Chinese counterpart to product a piece of 
equipment, or other item, by means of the process of licensing. The transfer of 
technology and its absorption by the Chinese enterprise proceeds in phases that 
gradually lead to a point where the enterprise can complete the product mostly or 
entirely from its own materials or components.
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Joint ventures have developed against the background of China's two-pronged 
desire to acquire both foreign technology and capital. The promulgation of the 'Joint 
Venture Law' in August 1979 and the detailed rules for its implementation in 
September 1983 have, to some extent, provided foreign investors with legal protection 
of their interests in China.
Table 2.2 Foreign-invested ventures approved in China by number and by 
amount of foreign capital pledged, 1979-1988
1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 Total
Equity joint ventures 
No. 6 20 28 29 107 741 1300 892 1399 3900 8532
US$m  8 63 28 29 188 1060 2027 1375 1920 3100 9899
Co-operative production 
No. 320 70 402 331 1089 1500 582 786 1580 6778
US$m  500 1300 926 504 2189 1358 1286 1600 13863
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
No. 4 14 12 18 26 46 18 45 410 594
US$m  14 262 55 44 79 118 20 470 480 1524
Source: MOFERT data, reported in China Business Review, May 1988, p. 57, and 
Beijing Review, May 6 1989, pp. 17-18.
By the end of 1981, 30 joint ventures approved in pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, precision instrument, textile, petroleum industry, etc. had a total volume 
of approximately US$200 million in terms of foreign investment involved.
(d) Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These were first established in mid-1979. 
Among other functions, the SEZs are established to attract foreign investment and 
technology.
2.4 Foreign Suppliers o f Technology to China
Characteristic of China's imports of technology is the shift from suppliers in
the former centrally planned economies to those in the market economies.
2.4.1 Pre-reform period
Table 2.3 gives a breakdown by country of the foreign suppliers for the period 
1950 to 1959. The largest supplier was the former Soviet Union in terms of both
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number of contracts signed (127 in total) and contract value (1,208.53 million 
Roubles).
Table 2.3 Main Technology Transfer Projects by Country: 1950 - 1959
(Million Rouble)
Country Contract number Contract values
Bulgaria 2 2.38
Czechoslovakia 26 16.08
East Germany 36 20.16
Hungary 7 35.19
Poland 21 72.44
Romania 10 20.10
Soviet Union 127 1208.53
Total 229 1701.04
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table from the following source.
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990 {Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p.l5.
The disadvantage of depending heavily on one major technology supplier 
surfaced in 1960 with the withdrawal of almost all Soviet technical personnel together 
with coded technical information, following the ideological conflict between the two 
countries. The subsequent shift to technology suppliers in the market economies was 
long and difficult due to the trade embargoes against China in the 1960s and 1970s^. 
However, China managed to sign a series of trade agreements with Western suppliers 
except the United States. From 1963 to 1968 a total of 79 contracts worth US$300 
million were signed with 11 countries such as Japan, West Germany, Britain, France 
and Italy. Figure 2.1 shows the number of main technology contracts signed by 
country with Japan having the largest number of contracts.
^Trade embargo imposed upon China from the 1950s onwards made it difficult for China to seek 
technology from other industrialised countries but the former Soviet Union and other then socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe. For embargo lists and their explanations, see U.S. Mutual Defence 
Assistance Control Act Administrator, 1957. For the alteration of the original embargo lists as a result 
of the loosening of strict trade embargo, see A Survey of the Strategic Trade Control Programme, 
1960.
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Figure 2.1 Main Technology Import by supplier: 1963-1968
Country of supplier
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990 {Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p.39.
Note: EG = East Germany; PO = Poland; CZ = Czechoslavakia; AU = Austria; HO = Holand; IT 
= Italy; SS = Switzerland; SW = Sweden; FR = France; UK = The United Kingdom; WG = West 
Germany; and JA = Japan.
The 1970s marked a change in the sources of China's imports of technology. 
This was helped by the normalisation of Sino-American diplomatic relationship^. 
Figure 2.2 shows the technology suppliers by country from 1971 to 1978. Japan was 
the largest supplier, West Germany the second and the UK the third; US suppliers 
gained 8.5 per cent of the market share.
^The normalisation of Sino-American relation was marked by Shanghai Communiqué (1972), whose 
English version was published in Peking Review, March 3rd, 1972. For more information on Sion- 
American relationship in the 1970s, see Marie-Luise Nath, 1976; James T. Myers, 1973.
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Figure 2 .2  Main Technology suppliers by country: 1971-78
HO 4.04%__
FR 6.28%
JA 34.539
WG 25.119
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990 {Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p.51.
2.4.2 Reform period: 1979 -1997
The characteristic of this period is that while further strengthening links with 
suppliers from Western countries, China also started searching for technology co­
operation with the newly industrialising and other developing countries and resumed 
technological co-operation with most of the former socialist countries.
Table 2.4 shows that Japan continued to be the major technology supplier, but 
the USA had moved into second place, with Germany in the third. Technology co­
operation with the newly industrialising and other developing countries, though not 
significant in terms of either contract number or value, reflected the increased range of 
China’s technology co-operation. And the resumption of technology co-operation with 
all former socialist countries shows that China's decision-makers were becoming more 
economies-oriented rather than politics-oriented.
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Table 2.4 Main Technology Transfer Projects by Country: 1979-90 (US$b)
Technology Contracts Complete Plant Contracts Total
Country Number of Contract Number of Contract Number of Contract
Contracts value contracts value contracts value
Japan 510 0.6670 575 5.2877 1085 5.9547
West Germany 490 0.6417 277 4.1826 767 4.8243
USA 633 1.8119 302 1.9099 935 3.7218
The UK 158 0.1166 70 1.1245 228 1.2411
France 101 0.4390 77 1.8877 178 2.3267
Sweden 33 0.0340 35 0.1582 68 0.1922
Switzerland 73 0.0577 51 0.3277 124 0.3854
Holland 26 0.0694 9 0.0340 35 0.1034
Italy 81 0.1555 130 1.8908 211 2.0463
Belgium 10 0.0100 19 0.3260 29 0.3360
Denmark 23 0.0120 17 0.1324 40 0.1444
Austria 37 0.0427 17 0.0876 54 0.1303
Australia 22 0.0092 9 0.0487 31 0.0579
New Zealand 4 0.0016 0 0.0000 4 0.0016
Canada 39 0.0535 78 0.6666 117 0.7201
Norway 7 0.0116 9 0.0195 16 0.0361
Finland 8 0.0087 15 0.0894 23 0.0981
Ireland 1 0.0003 0 0.0000 1 0.0003
Liechtenstein 1 0.0004 0 0.0000 1 0.0004
Luxembourg 4 0.0133 4 0.0119 8 0.0252
Greece 0 0.0000 1 0.0008 1 0.0008
Spain 4 0.1614 14 0.0715 18 0.2329
Czechoslovakia 7 0.4574 2 0.2580 9 0.7154
Romania 1 0.0024 3 0.0135 4 0.0159
Poland 13 0.0210 15 0.1443 28 0.1653
UN 2 0.0000 0 0.0000 2 0.0000
Yugoslavia 1 0.0016 3 0.0321 4 0.0337
Former USSR 8 0.0270 20 1.2319 28 1.2589
East Germany 21 0.1600 8 0.0600 29 0.2200
Bulgaria 1 0.0706 0 0.0000 1 0.0706
Hungary 4 0.0028 2 0.0067 6 0.0095
Argentina 1 0.0035 1 0.0014 2 0.0049
Brazil 5 0.0026 0 0.0000 5 0.0026
Venezuela 1 0.0004 0 0.0000 1 0.0004
Hong Kong 69 0.0650 119 0.1748 188 0.2398
India 1 0.0002 0 0.0000 1 0.0000
Macao 1 0.0004 0 0.0000 1 0.0004
Malaysia 1 0.0014 0 0.0000 1 0.0014
Philippine 2 0.0005 0 0.0000 2 0.0005
Singapore 6 0.0012 9 0.0091 15 0.0103
Thailand 0 0.0000 1 0.0011 1 0.0011
Total 2410 5.1350 1892 20.1906 4302 25.3256
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table from the following source.
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990 {Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p.81-2.
2.5 Technology Transfer to China's Machine-Building Industry
The growing importance of China's machine-building industry in the process 
of industrialisation is revealed by the number of technology transfer agreements. 
During the First and Second-Five-Year Plan periods (from 1950 to 1959), the 
machine-building industry ranked fourth in terms of the number of technology
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imports, fifth by the total value of the contracts and even lower by average contract 
value. Details are in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Technology Imports by sector: 1950-59 (Million Rouble)
Industry Number of 
contracts
Contract
value
Average
value
Coal mining 31 95.89 3.09
Non-ferrous metal mining 7 15.85 2.26
Food industry 8 26.82 3.35
Textile industry 5 17.40 3.48
Paper and paper products 5 20.78 4.16
Water power and electricity 66 486.57 7.73
Petroleum refining 4 55.35 13.84
Chemical industry 14 114.78 8.20
Pharmaceutical industry 2 7.35 3.68
Rubber products 1 8.86 8.86
Plastic products 1 0.11 0.11
Building materials 21 71.08 3.38
Ferrous metal processing 11 412.27 37.48
Non-ferrous metal processing 6 82.85 13.81
Machine-building industry 19 128.61 6.77
Transport equipment 3 61.68 20.56
Electrical equipment 8 26.83 3.36
Electronic and telecommunications 2 23.58 11.79
Meters, instruments, etc. 3 10.59 3.53
Total 217 1667.27
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table from the following source. 
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990 
{Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p. 16.
After the withdrawal of the Soviet technical assistance and the three-year 
natural disaster in the early 1960s, China entered a period of economic re-adjustment. 
In this period, the country’s agriculture, textile and light industries were at the top of 
the development agenda. This change in development priorities brought 
corresponding changes in the imports of technology. The machine-building industry’s 
expenditures on technology imports dropped to 10.9 per cent of the total, 12.2 per cent 
lower than that in the period 1950 to 1959 .^
These changes were partly reversed in the next decade. The 1970s saw a boom 
in technology transfer to China's machine-building industry. Official statistics of
^See The Bureau of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the State Planning Committee, The 
Bureau of Technology Import & Export of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and 
The information Centre for Technology Transfer of the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics, 1992, 
pp. 11 - 36.
29
technology imports show the importance of the machine-building industry. Table 2.6 
shows that in the 1970s the machine-building industry had thirteen technology import 
contracts while four other industries, namely coal mining, petroleum and natural gas, 
chemicals, leather and fur, had only one each, and the ferrous metal industry and 
transport equipment industry had three contracts each. Machine-building industry now 
ranked third by number of contracts and fourth by contract value.
Table 2.6 Technology Imports by Sector: 1971-78 (US$m)
Technology Contracts Equipment Contracts
Industry Number of Contract Number of Contract
contracts values contracts values
Coal mining 1 5.51 47 904.30
Textile industry 0 0.00 1 67.50
Printing 0 0.00 1 1.63
Water power and electricity 0 0.00 13 313.25
Petroleum and natural gas 1 1.15 2 37.45
Petroleum refining 0 0.00 18 400.63
Chemical industry 1 3.32 60 1704.58
Chemical fibre 0 0.00 7 865.62
Building materials 0 0.00 5 69.84
Leather and fur products 1 0.77 3 65.21
Ferrous metal processing 3 1.01 17 1885.98
Non-ferrous metal processing 0 0.00 2 147.90
Machine-building industry 13 312.40 19 975.48
Transport equipment 3 3.13 7 73.30
Electrical equipment 0 0.00 1 5.02
Electronic/telecommunications 0 0.00 3 29.45
Computer 1 2.25 0 0.00
Household electronics 0 0.00 4 152.88
Other industries 0 0.00 1 5.20
Total 24 329.53 212 7392.82
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table from the following source. 
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990
{Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p.53.
In the 1980s and early 1990s technology imports greatly enhanced by various 
reform measures. These included greater autonomy for local governments and 
enterprises in relation to technology transfer^. Certain industries, including machine- 
building, electronics and light industries, were selected as priority sectors. A total of 
847 technology contracts was signed by machine-building industry worth 
US$1,256.56 million, amounting to 24 per cent of the total contract value of
^For more information, see Zhongguo Keji Luntan ( Forum on Science and Technology in China ), No. 
5,1987, pp. 18-21.
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Table 2.7 Technology Imports by Sector; 1979-90 (US$m)
Technology Contracts Equipment Contracts
Industry Number of 
contracts
Contract
values
Number of 
contracts
Contract
values
Coal mining 25 19.29 24 196.47
Ferrous metal mining 4 0.78 0 0.00
Non-ferrous metal mining 8 4.95 3 15.87
Quarry & mineral mining 10 4.07 0 0.00
Other mining 1 0.25 0 0.00
Timber 0 0.00 2 5.01
Water industry 0 0.00 2 7.73
Food industry 8 4.91 44 120.06
Beverage 17 6.68 10 58.34
Tobacco 9 58.34 16 147.67
Animal feed 0 0.00 8 16.15
Textile industry 9 3.80 32 178.29
Sewing industry 1 0.40 3 1.39
Leather/fur products 5 4.56 6 13.50
Wood products 1 1.57 8 30.06
Furniture 1 0.00 3 5.30
Paper and paper products 11 20.33 38 386.72
Printing 5 4.11 5 11.95
Cultural products 4 1.23 3 4.69
Water power and electricity 35 210.00 77 5548.26
Petroleum and natural gas 62 349.80 0 0.00
Petroleum refining 36 89.74 27 422.58
Coking coal and products 6 13.90 8 67.52
Chemical industry 197 530.57 193 3968.73
Chemical fibre 14 45.60 63 606.11
Pharmaceutical industry 31 63.10 24 106.83
Rubber products 14 66.13 23 69.52
Plastic industry 15 9.03 34 62.38
Building materials 47 60.26 128 557.26
Ferrous metal processing 40 144.25 135 3860.62
Non-ferrous metal processing 31 75.00 66 326.28
Metal products 12 5.73 12 42.06
Machine-building industry 847 1256.56 134 454.62
Transport equipment 205 1277.53 51 618.31
Electrical equipment 185 157.25 95 265.02
Electronic/telecommunications 151 267.40 214 542.73
Computer 53 100.18 31 55.62
Household electronics 37 65.63 94 455.40
Meters, instruments, etc. 181 109.89 26 41.96
Other industries 24 11.49 4 3.27
Total 2324 5044.62 1646 19274.24
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table from the following source.
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990
{Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p.83-4.
US$5,044.62 million (see Table 2.7). The search for alternative technology suppliers,
started since early 1960s, was further extended to the developed and former socialist
countries; details are shown in Table 2.8. At the same time, the mechanisms of
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technology transfer were also greatly changed: licensing now became a dominate 
mechanism, accounting for 643 out of 847 contracts.
Since the late 1980s there has been a decline in the number of technology 
contracts, mainly as a consequence of the national policy to cool down an overheated 
economy. The number of contracts dropped to only 16 in 1989. Subsequently, 
however, with the re-adjustment of macroeconomic and microeconomic policies in the 
1990s there has been a revival of technology transfer to the machine-building 
industry.
Table 2.8 Technology Transfer to China's Machine-Building Industry: 
by Number of Licensing Agreement: 1979 - 1990
Year
Country 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Total
USA 0 3 7 5 15 16 29 22 21 7 2 5 132
Japan 2 6 6 10 5 23 50 26 13 7 4 2 154
West Germany 7 4 4 7 14 28 43 31 28 14 7 6 193
The UK 2 2 1 1 2 5 11 7 5 5 1 7 49
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 4 7 0 0 2 36
France 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 5 3 2 0 0 16
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 4
Sweden 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 2 0 0 0 12
Switzerland 1 2 0 0 0 6 8 7 1 1 1 1 28
Canada 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Austria 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 8
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Belgium 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
Holland 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
East Germany 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 5
The former USSR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Hungary 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 12 19 19 26 42 87 164 110 83 39 16 26 643
Note: The table is an English version o f the Chinese table for the following source. 
Source: Forty Year's Imports of Foreign Technology of China: 1950 - 1990
{Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jishuyinjin Sishinian: 1950 - 1990), p. 188-247.
2.6 Impact o f  Technology Transfer
One of the advantages of being a technology " latecomer" is that a country does not 
have to "reinvent the wheel". Instead, it can achieve rapid economic development by 
importing existing technology from other countries. However, technology transfer
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may not be carried out smoothly due to the shortcomings in import-related and other 
economic policies. Moreover, since the process of technology development is highly 
dynamic, whereby existing technology is made obsolete, the technology latecomer 
may be doomed to be always a technology follower. To avoid this, the transfer of 
technology should help enhance the indigenous R&D, to ensure an improvement of 
domestic enterprises’ technological capabilities. As a technology latecomer and maybe 
the largest purchaser of foreign technology in the world, China has encountered 
serious problems in the assimilation of imported technologies. These problems have 
often been reported in the Chinese media.
The major problems include equipment-biased imports, unplanned and unco­
ordinated imports, the import of inappropriate technology, the insufficient use of 
much imported equipment, widespread duplication of imports, bias towards short­
term economic gain rather than long-term development of technological capabilities 
and little assimilation of imported technology (Cao Jiarui, 1986; Richard Conroy, 
1992: 212-218). A study of nine medium-sized and large projects, introduced in the 
period 1980 - 82, concluded that six of them achieved poor economic results. Another 
study of 30 large turnkey projects, started in the 1970s, reported that, in terms of the 
length of time taken for construction, utilisation rate and operational results, only one- 
third of the projects were satisfactory. A survey of 220 projects in the machine- 
building and electronics sectors between 1973 and 1984 showed that only 39 per cent 
of the projects achieved 80 per cent of their designed capacity and just 7 per cent of 
the products manufactured could be sold internationally. A later survey, conducted in 
1986, on 630 machine-building enterprises drew a similar dismal picture. Only 40 per 
cent of the enterprises reached reasonable capacity levels and many relied entirely on 
imported components. These survey thus indicate significant waste of investment and 
inefficiencies in the technology-transfer process.
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A major problem is that assimilation of imported technology had not even 
reached the stage of mastering normal production operations, let alone the 
development of more complex assimilative capabilities. The extent of the problem is 
shown in Figure 2.3 by the low levels of domestic supply of inputs. Further evidence 
comes from a SSTC survey of 2,300 technology import projects, which estimated that 
only 9.2 per cent of imported technologies had been assimilated^. The picture is even 
more stark if assimilation efforts are measured in terms of funds invested: for 
instance, in Shanghai the ratio of expenditures for technology import to assimilation 
efforts was 40:1 in the period 1985-87. The situation in less developed regions is 
probably much worse^o
Figure 2.4 Imported Technology: 1986
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Richard Conroy (1992: 227-44) summarised the main reasons for the poor 
record of assimilation mentioned in the SSTC survey. In order of importance, these 
include the different levels of technical experience between Chinese and Western 
industry, input quality, funding for assimilation projects, organisational and 
institutional constraints, technological blockades, regional and ministerial conflicts.
^See Shuliang Jinji Jishu Jingi Yanjiu (Quantitative and Technological Economic Research), No. 3, 
1988, p.5.
^®See Renmin Ribao (The People's Daily), August 20th, 1988, p.3.
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financial constraints such as unfavourable tax and pricing policies, shortage and low 
quality of enterprise technical staff, together with some less important reasons such as 
risk aversion, backward management, poor feasibility studies and so fbrtWk
In view of these shortcomings, the government formulated some specific 
regulations in 1986 covering the scope, management, funding of a s s i m i l a t i o n ^ ^  
However, the record of the implementation of these regulations has been poor and the 
consensus in China is that cases of successful assimilation by individual enterprises 
were the exception, rather than the rule^ .^
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Chapter 3
In Search for Foreign Technology; Enterprise Size 
and Its Technological Behaviour
3.1 Introduction
The concentration of advanced technology in the economically developed countries, 
the dynamic nature of technology development and the commercialisation of 
technology with proprietary rights underlie developing countries’ need for the 
international transfer of technology (Stewart, 1981: 67). In market-oriented economies 
technology transfer is carried out by independent economic actors, motivated by profit 
considerations, though keeping in line with relevant government regulations. In 
command economies, however, transfer is initiated by government agencies that are 
almost solely motivated by administrative rules and procedure; state-owned 
enterprises passively wait for, rather than actively search for, their technology just as 
they wait for the state supply of other production inputs (Poznanski, 1985: 2).
China's industrial economic reforms, which began in early 1980\ allowed SOEs 
to operate as relatively independent producers and to search for their inputs of 
technology. These changes have raised many important questions. How do SOEs 
obtain information about the available technologies? How do they choose a particular 
technology? What are the criteria used? Do economic factors such as size and R&D 
expenditures also influence their technological behaviour? These questions are 
examined in this chapter.
Section 2 briefly discusses the influence of China's industrial economic reforms 
on SOEs' technological behaviour. In Section 3, we discuss some hypotheses for
F^or detailed description and studies of Chinese industrial reforms, see Xue Muqiao, 1981; Ma Hong, 
1983; William A. Byrd, 1983,1987a, 1987b, 1991,and 1992; Chossudovsky, 1986.
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empirical analyses. Section 4 describes the data used for the tests and the procedure 
employed. The results are presented in Section 5. The research findings are 
summarised in the last section.
3.2 Chinese Industrial Reforms: a Brief Description
China's centrally planned economy and the constraints imposed upon SOEs ruled out 
any scope for them to choose their technologies. The government decided on the 
choice of technology, whether it was introduced by building new plants or updating 
existing ones, the way it was to be adapted, which production lines would be 
eliminated as technologically obsolete, which plants would be refitted and reoriented 
and which would be closed down. In fact, about thirty years since the founding of the 
PRC, the government followed the Soviet style development strategy. About 90 per 
cent of the foreign exchange was earmarked for importing turn-key plants and 
equipment rather than for improving existing technology (Brugger, 1985: 112-5; Guo 
and Yang, 1982).
The centralised foreign trade regime effectively cut off SOEs from foreign 
technology suppliers. Instead, state-owned foreign trade enterprises acted as the 
medium for importing technologies and then distributed the technologies to SOEs as 
chosen by central economic planning agencies (Pomfiret, 1991; Lardy, 1992; and 
Panagariya, 1993). This system was reinforced by the government’s tight control over 
foreign exchange. Even if SOEs had been given free access to foreign technology 
suppliers, their ability to choose foreign technologies would have been limited, 
because they lacked the required capabilities.
Following the Soviet model, scientific research, especially basic research, was 
concentrated mainly in the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) while applied
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research and engineering design institutes were set up within various industrial 
ministries (Dean, 1979: 28-29, cf. Fan 1984: 39; and Suttmeier, 1980b: 31). The 
system was characterised by structural defects: as Wang (1993: 97-99) noted, it 
effectively weakened the link between scientific research and industrial production. 
SOEs were denied access to scientific knowledge that was essential both to develop 
and strengthen their technological capabilities.
Economic reforms have changed the way SOEs are managed. The government’s 
role has been reduced fi*om direct involvement in all aspects of SOEs production to 
only providing guidelines. Reforms in the S&T management systems have also 
created a more advantageous environment.
Technology can now be acquired by SOEs through domestic and international 
transfers. The SSTC’s statistics show that during the period 1983 - 88 the total value 
of domestic technology trade increased fi*om RMB30 million yuan to RMB7.250 
hiWion yuan (SSTC, 1990: 42). The Industrial enterprises were responsible for about 
75 per cent of this traded in 1988 (SSTC, 1988). According to the latest official 
statistics the annual average value of domestic technology trade for the period 1991- 
97 was RMB22.886 billion ywa» (China Statistical Yearbook, 1998, p726). Imports of 
technology and equipment were even more significant: technology-related contracts 
for imports had a total value of US$ 504.46 billion (RMB 1,957.31 billion yuan^), i.e. 
124 times greater than the value of domestically traded technology. In 1997 the total 
foreign investment in the manufacturing sector was US$398.009 billion (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 1998, p643).
2 See, The Foreign Trade and Economic Bureau of the State Economic Planning Commission, The 
Technology Import and Export Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and
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3.3 Choice o f  Technology: Reasons, Criteria, Sources, Enterprise Size and its 
Technological Effort
Industrial enterprises now had to make their own decisions in relation to the choice of 
technology. We examine three main questions: ( i ) what were the enterprises’ reasons 
for choosing foreign technology, (ii) what criteria were used, and (iii) what were the 
sources of information about those technologies.
3.3.1 Reasons o f  choosing foreign technology
Why choose foreign technology? Stewart (1981: 68) sums up three main reasons that 
help explain the quite substantial amount of technology transfer from developed to 
developing countries: the need for a specific technology and its local unavailability, 
the lower cost of importing a technology rather than developing it locally and 
developing countries desire to import technology in an effort to gain access to foreign 
markets.
In the case of China, in the aftermath of the Soviet style development strategy, 
which left much backward technology and aged equipment, the government’s 
economic reforms and enterprises’ profit motivation have led to an increase in the use 
of imported technology and equipment. Five main reasons underlying this will be 
examined: (a) local unavailability of technology; (b) immaturity of local technology;
(c) high price of local technology;(d) low quality of local technology^; and (e) short 
supply of local technology^. One may argue that these reasons are not mutually 
exclusive and in fact ‘unavailability’, ‘short supply’ and ‘higher price’ are different 
names for the same reason. In an economy where market forces are allowed to play an
the Information Exchange Centre of the Import of Foreign Technology of the Ministry of Machine 
Building and electronics, 1992: 6).
2 low quality of local technology refers to the quality of equipment which embodies the technology. 
%id.
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important role, the higher price of a commodity signals its shortage in supply and 
demand for it may have to be met by imports, ie the choice for foreign technology is 
motivated by unavailability. There are reasons for such treatment in this study: the 
difficulties associated with mailed questionnaire survey and consideration of the 
hypothesis of the traditional SOEs. These two reasons are closely related. Lack of 
face-to-face communications, which is characteristic of interview guided by a written 
questionnaire, in mailed questionnaire survey makes it impossible for us to clarify our 
questions and for us to know who our respondents are. And it is suggested (James 
1989b) that three behavioural alternatives (to the neo-classical model) can be used to 
explain SOEs’ technological behaviour: X-efficiency theory (Leibenstein, 1978, 
1980), the “engineering-man” hypothesis ( Wells, 1975), and the “bureaucratic man” 
hypothesis (Williams, 1975). Different wording helps us to overcome the difficulties 
associated with mailed questionnaire survey by considering the answers in terms of 
the three behavioural alternatives. In fact, that most of SOEs surveyed considered 
‘unavailability’ as the most important reason for choosing foreign technology 
provided additional evidence for the ‘ engineering-man’ hypothesis.
(a) Local unavailability o f technology. Certain technologies can not be generated by 
the enterprises in developing countries, or purchased fi*om other local sources. This 
is a primary reason why enterprises go for foreign technologies.
(b) Immaturity o f  local technology. Sometimes a domestic technology is available, 
but is merely a draft, or a prototype model, which needs further development 
before it can be transferred to industrial enterprises. This was a very familiar 
problem in China and arose because under the old management system S&T 
institutes had little monetary incentive to go beyond the prototype. Moreover, 
given the past problems in the price and subsidy systems, imperfect product
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markets penalised innovators (Conroy, 1989a; 526; Saich, 1989: 35; Shirk, 
1985:199-200). And even though the government enacted the Patent Law in 1984 
and the Technology Contract Law in 1987, their enforcement has been 
unsatisfactory and detrimental to the development of indigenous technology.
{c) Higher price of local technology. Cost considerations are also important. 
Recently, Shoudu Iron and Steel Company, one of China’s largest iron and steel 
companies, decided to purchase all its equipment and related technology from a 
Belgian steel firm, because the offer made by a Shanghai steel equipment 
enterprise was more expensive and the delivery date was not guaranteed (Che 
Muqi, 1992).
(d) Low quality o f local technology. Enterprises that had to use local technology and 
machines suffered from frequent breakdowns and the poor after-sale services.
(e) Short supply o f local technology. Insufficient production of capital goods causes 
excess demand. Enterprises can not wait until the domestic suppliers increase their 
production and consequently seek other sources of supply.
The poor development of China's capital goods sector due to the lack of 
investment made it difficult for existing enterprises to increase their production 
capacity. Table 3.1 shows the technological levels as measured by the vintage of 
machinery and equipment used in medium-sized and large enterprises. Only 25 per 
cent of the machinery and equipment used in the machine-building industry was of 
1980s technological level - 9 per cent lower than the national average. 30 per cent of 
them was put in use in the 1950s and 1960s.
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Table 3.1 Technological Levels of China's Machinery and Equipment 
Used in Medium-sized and Large Enterprises
Technological Level
Industry 80's 70's 60's 50's 40's(a)
National(b) 33.99% 41.03% 13.43% 8.6% .95%
Machine-building 24.73% 46.46% 17.97% 10.51% .33%
Source: Cao Jianjiun and Liu Xuming (1991), 'Reflection on Price Problem in 
Invigorating Large and Medium-sized Enterprises', Jiage Yuekan{?ncQ 
Monthly), no. 7, pp. 19-22, in Chinese.
Notes: (a) referring to pre-liberation period;
(b) National industry average.
Other research reinforces this problem. A study showed that 60% of the 
machinery and equipment used in all medium-sized enterprises and large in Sichuan 
province was of the 1960s' vintage while the remaining 40% was even older(Cheng 
Yongzhong and Qin Rong, 1991).
3.3.2 Criteria for choosing foreign technology
Attention is focused here on criteria used by the enterprise. Following
Deolalikar and Sundaram (1989), we will consider five criteria; (a) price of
technology; (b) vintage of the technology to be imported; (c) suitability of technology
to be bought; (d) reputation of the technology supplier(s); and (e) nature of
technology, i.e. whether it is labour-intensive or capital intensive. In the absence of
market distortions the technology chosen by individual enterprises with their own
criteria will also be suitable for the economy as a whole.
(a) The price of technology to be imported. Even after the foreign trade liberalisation 
and the loosening of government control over foreign exchange, Chinese 
enterprises are still faced with a shortage of foreign exchange. Only a relatively
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small amount of foreign exchange earnings may be retained by enterprises, often 
not enough to finance projects for foreign technology collaboration. This makes 
Chinese enterprises very concerned about the price of (or payment for) their 
imports of technology. Moreover, SOEs have to pay interests on loans raised, 
which increases the costs of imported technologies.
(b) The technological level o f technology to be imported. An empirical study reveals 
that Indian enterprises, irrespective of ownership pattern, believed that the most 
important criterion for choosing foreign technology was that ‘the know-how should 
be the latest breakthrough and state-of-art’ (Deolalikar and Sunndaram, 1989: 103). 
A study on the United States-China technology transfer showed that the most 
important criterion for a successful technology transfer is the acquisition of the 
new technology with ‘cutting edge’ (Glinow, Schnepp, and Bhambri, 1991:179).
(c) The suitability of foreign technology. Stewart (1981 and 1977) pointed out that 
LDCs differ greatly from DCs in socio-economic conditions and technology 
created to suite DCs may not be appropriate to LDCs. In recent years technology 
suppliers have begun to adapt their technologies to suite LDCs' social and 
economic conditions either due to increasing competition in international 
technology transfer or to the third world firms' increasingly strong bargaining 
power. For Chinese enterprises, ‘suitability’ refers to the ‘targeted markets’ and is 
for ‘eventual localisation’ (Glinow, et al, 1991: 182).
(d) The reputation of technology suppliers. For some writers the reputation of 
technology suppliers implies that the technology or know-how is ‘world-famous 
and well-established’ (Deolalikar and Sundaram, 1989:103). In the Chinese
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context, it would be more appropriate to expand this criterion to include the 
established amicable relations with foreign technology suppliers. For example, 
studies on technology transfer to China showed that Chinese enterprises were more 
likely to work with their old friends than new strangers.
(e) The nature o f technology to be imported. Technology can either be labour- 
intensive or capital-intensive. Abundant labour resource and a shortage of hard 
currency in LDCs justify the use of labour-intensive technology.
3.3.3 Sources for information on foreign technology to be imported
Economic liberalisation makes it not only possible but also necessary, for SOEs to
search for information on foreign technology. Six sources of technology information 
are discussed below. They are (a) factory director's visits abroad, (b) R&D personnel's 
visits abroad, (c) foreign industrial and commercial exhibitions in China, (d) technical 
consultancy, (e) professional trade journals, and (f) foreign technology suppliers.
(a) Factory director’s visits abroad. Economic reforms have changed the enterprise's 
leadership system and granted decision-making power in all aspects of production 
and development to factory directors.
Inherent in the pre-reform director responsibility system under the leadership 
of enterprise party committee was the substitution of the party leadership for the 
director's economic management and the separation of the director's responsibility 
from his decision-making power. As early as 1980, an experiment was conducted 
with the reform of the enterprise leadership system in selected SOEs was 
conducted (Huang Yongjing, 1985:40) and more SOEs reformed their leadership 
system after the promulgation of the draft "Company Law" on November 22,1984.
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The reformed leadership system holds enterprise directors responsible for, among 
other things, the enterprise technological progress.
(b) R&D personnel’s visits abroad. Reforms in relation to labour management and 
S&T management systems facilitated the movement of scientists and researchers in 
national research institutions and higher educational organisations into SOEs, 
mainly medium-sized and large ones. They helped SOEs set up or improve R&D 
divisions. According to a study of 108 SOEs that won the National Enterprise 
Technological Progress Awards, 100 of them were large SOEs^ with their own 
research institutes or R&D centres (The Enterprise Department of the Association 
of China's Industrial Economy, 1992:54). A R&D department always takes on the 
responsibility for searching technology information abroad and at home as well. 
Large R&D departments may benefit from economies of scale in search for 
technology information by sending their R&D personnel abroad. In fact, many 
large SOEs' R&D departments not only serve their own enterprises but are also 
contractors of other enterprises’ research projects.
(c) Foreign industrial and commercial exhibitions. To look for potential buyers or 
venture partners, foreign companies hold industrial and commercial exhibitions in 
China. These exhibitions are an important source of information on foreign 
technology.
(d) Technical consultation. As a source of information on foreign technology, 
technical consultation may come from various organisations: other enterprises.
^Examples are Capital Iron and Steel Company, No. 2 Vehicle Plant, Nanjing Radio Plant, Yantai 
Polaris Watch and Clock Company Group, etc.
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higher education organisations, state-run S&T research institutes, private 
consultants, etc.
(e) Professional trade and technical journals. Foreign technical and trade journals 
were a very important source of technology information. Imports of these journals 
were stopped during the Culture Revolution in the late 1960s and 70s and were 
resumed since the economic reforms. Enterprises now have easy access to both 
foreign and Chinese professional trade and technical journals.
(f) Technology suppliers. A foreign company has an incentive to provide 
technological information as that will attract potential technology buyers. However 
the information released may be very limited.
3.4 Enterprise Size and Technological Efforts
In the previous subsections, we have discussed various reasons and criteria used by 
SOEs in searching for foreign technologies and sources of technological information. 
We want to examine whether these aspects of technological behaviour are related to 
enterprise size and technological efforts.
3.4.1. Enterprise size. Various indicators can be used as measures of enterprise 
size but most of them may face problems. The level of employment may be affected 
by trade union’s role in influencing the management manpower policy and 
government restrictions on the displacement of labour. Asset measure may be 
influenced by investment allowances (Katrak, 1990).
Compared with these alternatives, sales revenue has the advantage of neutrality 
with respect to factor proportions and is also used as the principal scale variable in
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enterprise’s R&D decisions (Scherer, 1965; and Mansfield, 1979). However, it may 
also be influenced by government policies, for example, import restrictions, licensing 
of productive capacity.
In the case of China, these measures raise some further problems discussed in 
the next chapter.
3.4.2. Enterprise technological effort. Instead of research and development 
expenditures, other input indicators of technological effort exist but they have their 
own limitations. It is argued that, for example, it is the creativity of science and 
technology personnel and their effective co-operation not their number and formal 
qualification that count. Similarly, technological effort may not be enhanced merely 
by the effluxion of time (Fransman, 1984:35). The reason that R&D expenditure is 
used in our study is data availability.
3.5 Test Procedures and Data
3.5.1. Probit and Logit regression analyses
A study of SOEs' behaviour in choosing foreign technology entails the use of binary 
dependent variables. The following sections will discuss the problems involved: 
whether or not a state-owned industrial enterprise regards some reasons as important 
in choosing foreign technology, whether it ranks some criteria as more important, and 
whether it believes one source of information on foreign technology as more 
important than others.
The dependent variable is set up as a 0-1 dummy variable; (for example, it is set 
equal to 1 for those regarding 'unavailability of technology' in domestic market as an 
important reason for going for foreign technology and equal to 0 for those not
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regarding it as important). The predicted value of the dependent variable will fall 
within the interval 0 to 1 and can be interpreted as the probability that the state-owned 
industrial enterprise will regard, say, 'unavailability of technology' as an important 
reason, given its characteristics (i.e., the values of the explanatory variables).
An obvious drawback to this approach is that it is quite possible to have estimated 
probabilities outside the 0-1 range. This could be avoided by converting estimated 
probabilities lying outside the 0-1 range to either 0 (when the estimate is negative) 
and 1 (when the estimate is greater than 1). This defines the linear probability model. 
Although this model is often used because of its computational ease, many researchers 
feel uncomfortable with it because outcomes are sometimes predicted with certainty 
when it is quite possible that they may not occur.
What is needed is some means of squeezing the estimated probabilities inside the 
0-1 interval without creating probability estimates of 0 or 1. Many possible functions 
of this nature are available, the two most popular being the cumulative normal 
function and the logistic function. Using the cumulative function for this purpose 
creates the probit model; using the logistic function creates the logit model. The 
probit model is used in this study.
Subsection 3.3.1 discussed reasons for going for foreign technology: 
unavailability, immaturity, high price, low quality, and short supply. These will be 
used alternatively as endogenous variables. Enterprise size and its technological effort 
are used as explanatory variables affecting enterprises' technological behaviour. 
Symbolically,
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R =J{SAL, RDE)
where R denotes a particular reason that the enterprise is asked to consider in order of 
importance; SAL denotes the sales revenue, a proxy for enterprise size and RDE 
denotes the research and development expenditures.
The probability distribution of the probit model is represented as follows:
Pj = tto + Pi SAL-^  + J^RDE-^  
where Pj is the probability that the zth enterprise considers any one of the five reasons 
with 0<Pj<l; SAL and RDE are as defined above. Thus, for each dependent variable, 
a probability probit model can be specified as follows:
P(UN)i= ao + P, SAL, + P^PDPi 
P(IM)i = ao + Pi SAL^ + P^PDP 
P(HP)i = ao + Pi SAL^ +P2  RDE\
P(LO)i = ao+ Pi SAL^  +P2  RDE\
P(SS)i = ao + Pi SAL^  +p2 RDE\ 
where UN denotes unavailability; IM refers to immaturity; HP stands for high price; 
LQ is low quality and SS is short supply. Copious literature shows that a firm’s R&D 
expenditures are considerably related to its sales revenue^. To overcome the 
multicollinearity problem, we will first regress endogenous variables only with regard 
to RDE*J
 ^For a detailed review on this issue, see Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; and for the relationship between 
sales and R&D expenditures for firms in developing countries, see Katrak, 1985; 1989; and 1990).
'I It is suggested that to solve this problem of multicolinearity, the following simple procedure can be 
followed:
a. Regressing RDE against SAL in the following linear form:
RDE  ^= a  + P SAL^
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The slope of the regression line of the probit model measures the effect of an unit 
change in SAL and RDE, or RDE* on the probability that an enterprise considers a 
certain reason as important in deciding whether to go for foreign technology. The 
coefficients Pj and p2  can actually take on either positive or negative signs. When they 
take on, say positive signs, it means that the probability that an enterprise considers, 
say UN, as an important reason increases with a unit change in its SAL or RDE or 
both.
The logit probability model can alternatively be used. And for either model 
logarithmic transformations of SAL, RDE or RDE* can be used.
3.5.2 The data
so as to obtain the estimates for both 6t and f
b. Substituting a  and f  for a  and p and by using the actual observations on
both RDE and SAL, we calculate the regressed RDE whose variation is completely explained by the 
variation in SAL. The formula used to calculate the regressed RDE is:
A
RDE  ^= â  + P  SAL^
A
c. Substituting RDE for RDE, we have,
A
RDE*= RD E-RD E
Since it is the part of the variation in RDE that is not affected by the systematic change in SAL, RDE* 
is not correlated linearly to SAL. Thus, when used as an explanatory variable along with SAL, RDE* 
helps to get rid of the multicolinearity problem.
d. Finally, substituting RDE* for RDE, we mn a new regression by using the probit probability
model,
Pj = tto + Pi SAL^ +P2 RDE*^
For example, let us still use UN as an example to explain the test of enterprise ranking behaviour under 
the condition that multicolinearity problem is taken into account. The probit probability model used is,
P (U N )i = tto+ Pi SAL  ^+ P2 RDE*^
where RDE* is the difference arrived at by using the above explained procedure (from a to d) and used 
to tackle the problem of multicollinearity.
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The data employed in this study was obtained through a questionnaire survey.^ A total 
of 2000 questionnaires were sent out to randomly selected enterprises in the Chinese 
machine-building industry. Of these, 131 responses were received; a response rate of 
6.55 per cent. Among the 131 respondents 123 were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Judged by the received answers, 95 were chosen to form the data set (n = 95). The 
data on the 95 enterprises is shown in Appendix B.
The sampled enterprises had an average sales revenue of 140.9 million RMB yuan 
with a standard deviation of ±21.69 million RMB yuan (see Table 3.2). In 
comparison, the average for the 42,496 enterprises in the industry as a whole was only
4.5 million RMB yuan per enterprise. However, if only the SOEs are compared with 
our sampled enterprises, 8,906 state-owned machine-building enterprises (with 
independent accounting status) had an average sales value of 145.3 million RMB yuan 
per SOE. Thus, our sample is representative of the SOEs in the same industry (State 
Statistical Bureau, 1992: 412, 420-1).
Table 3.2 Test Statistics of Questionnaire Survey Data
Test Statistics Average sales 
revenue 
(Million y«fl«)
Average R&D 
expenditure 
(Million y«fl«)
Average 
number of 
employees
Average 
number of 
engineers & 
technicians
Maximum 1,269.22 11.05 18,222 3,283
Minimum 0.23 0.002 125 15
Mean 140.09 1.07 3,378 322
S.D* 21.69 2.06 3,654 478
Source: Calculated from Table B .l in Appendix B. 
* Standard deviation
Due to the lack of data on labour force, engineers and technicians, and R&D 
expenditures by industry, it is impossible to compare our sample data with industry
^For detailed description of our questionnaire survey, please see Appendix A.
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level data on R&D expenditures, the number of employees and engineers and 
technicians.
3.6 The Empirical Results
The empirical tests in this section will first explore how the SOEs ranked various 
considerations discussed in previous sections, irrespective of enterprise size and 
technological effort. Following that, multiple regression analyses will examine the 
relationship between the considerations and enterprise size and technological effort.
3.6.1 Reasons for choosing foreign technology
The results of 95 SOEs' ranking all five reasons expressed in terms of both absolute 
number and percentage are given in Table 3.3. It is clear that unavailability, 
immaturity, and lower quality are the three main reasons why SOEs choose foreign 
technology and/or equipment (more than 60, 40, and 25% of the 95 SOEs considered 
these three reasons very important, respectively). In contrast, higher price and labour 
intensity were considered very important by a mere 3% of the SOEs.
Table 3.3 Enterprise Ranking of Reasons for Choosing Foreign 
Technology and Equipment
Main reason Very
important
Important Fairly
important
Un­
important
Total
Unavailability 60 22 4 9 95
(63.16) (23.16) (4.21) (9.47) (100)
Immaturity 42 34 6 13 95
(44.21) (35.79) (6.32) (13.68) (100)
Low quality 25 33 9 28 95
(26.32) (34.74) (9.47) (29.47) (100)
Higher price 3 12 27 53 95
(3.16) (12.63) (28.42) (55.79) (100)
Short supply 3 9 23 60 95
(3.16) (9.47) (24.21) (63.16) (100)
Source: Calculated from Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
Note: figures in parentheses are percentage
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These results will be revealed more clearly if a binary format is used, 
distinguishing the ‘very important’ and ‘important’ categories from the others. This 
shows that 82, 76, and 58 SOEs believed that unavailability, immaturity and low 
quality were respectively the main reasons for seeking foreign technology.
Alternatively, enterprise ranking behaviour can be examined by weighted averages. 
Table 3.4 gives the weighted averages for the five reasons: these are consistent with 
the above numbers and percentages.
Reason Weighted Average
Unavailability 1.6
Immaturity 2.0
Higher price 3.4
Lower Quality 2.4
Short supply 3.5
Source: Calculated from Table B.2 in Appendix B.
Correlation tests were tried with all five endogenous variables. The results are in 
Table 3.5. UN is significantly associated with each of the independent variables: the 
correlations with Log&4Z and LogÆD^ are significant at the 5 and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively. The correlation between Log&TL and UogRDE suggests that large 
enterprises are more likely to spend more on their R&D activities. (As discussed in 
Section 3.4, this correlation will raise problems of multicollinearity, which is dealt 
with in the footnote 7).
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Table 3.5 Correlation Analyses: Unavailability of Technology 
and the Independent Variables*
RDE SAL LogRDE LogSAL UN
RDE 1.000
SAL 0.276b 1.000
LogRDE 0.700a 0.465a 1.000
LogSAL 0.339b 0.755a 0.650a 1.000
UN 0.169 0.157 0.254b 0.208c 1.000
* The correlations are based on data on 95 enterprises in China's machine-building industry; 
RDE = R&D expenditures;
SAL = the level of sales, used as a measure of enterprise size;
LogRDE = logarithm of R&D expenditures;
LogSAL = logarithm of the level of sales;
UN = unavailability of technology;
Coefficients marked a, b, and c are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively.
Table 3.6 reports the regression results for the endogenous variables UN. These 
results were obtained with the logit model and also the probit model. The results from 
these two models are juxtaposed for comparison. Equation (i) examines the influence 
of SAL, equation (ii) employs RDE, while equation (iii) has both SAL and RDE to see 
their joint effect. The procedure is also tried for Log&4Z and LogRDE.
Table 3.6 Probit and Logit analyses Explaining Unavailability of Technology 
in Chinese Machine-Bnilding Enterprises: 1985-1991*
Probit Model Logit Model
Equation Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
(i) Constant 0.700a 3.424
SAL 0.269 1.563 - -
(ii) Constant 0.598a 3.045 0.784a 17.792
RDE 0.660h 1.770 0.351g 1.845
(iii) Constant 0.654a 3.029 0.747a 12.900
LogSAL 0.207f 1.898 0.498e 1.936
(iv) Constant 0.123 0.409 0.610a 8.185
LogRDE 0.297a 3.057 0.677a 3.406
(v) Constant 0.140 0.469 0.609a 7.872
LogSAL -.492 -.348 -.113 -.334
LogRDE 0.297b 2.435 0.709a 2.613
*The regressions are based on data of 95 enterprises in China's machine
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building industry that all undertake R&D activities.
SAL = the level of sales, used as measure of enterprise size;
RDE = R&D expenditures;
LogSAL = logarithm of SAL\
LogRDE = logarithm of RDE.
Coefficients marked a, b, e, f, g, and h are significantly different from zero at the 1 (or less than 1), 2, 
5, 6, 7, and 8 per cent levels, respectively.
When RDE and SAL are entered separately, each is significant with a positive 
sign. Similarly for the log forms. When the variables were employed in the same 
regression equation, we find that SAL became insignificant, while RDE remained 
significant. The constant term was not significant in equations (iv) and (v) for probit 
model, but was significant elsewhere.
The positive signs for SAL and RDE equations (i) and (ii) suggest that the 
probability that the enterprise considers UN as an important reason for choosing 
imported technologies increases with its size and technological efforts.
3.6.2 Criteria for choosing foreign technology
Next we consider the criteria used by SOEs when deciding whether to acquire foreign 
technology. The SOEs' ranking of the five criteria in order of importance is given in 
Table 3.7. Table B.3 in Appendix B provides the original data. Observers have 
sometimes maintained that for Chinese government, the major criterion for the 
selection of suppliers is the cost factor due to the chronic shortage of foreign exchange 
(Glinow, et al, 1991:180). This major criterion should be abided by enterprises, 
especially by SOEs in theory. We can see fi*om Table 3.7, that only 7 out of the 95 
SOEs considered ‘cheapness of foreign technology’ as a very important criterion. 
However, when both ‘very important’ and ‘important’ scales are considered together, 
nearly one half of the SOEs considered ‘cheapness’ to be an important criterion.
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Two other criteria highly ranked by SOEs are ‘advancement’ and ‘suitability’ of 
foreign technology. A surprising finding is that hardly any SOEs considered ‘labour 
intensity’ as important: given the manpower problems that the SOEs face, mainly 
manpower surplus and their responsibility for surplus manpower, we would expect 
that SOEs should choose labour intensive technology. A possible reason for this 
finding may lie in the SOEs belief that modem advanced technology is not compatible 
with the abundant labour in the Third World.
Table 3.7 Criteria Used for Choosing Foreign Technology
Criterion Very
important
Important Fairly
important
Un- Total 
important
Cheapness 1 36 26 26 95
(7.30) (37.90) (27.37) (27.37) (100)
Advancement 56 38 1 0 95
(58.95) (40.00) (1.05) (0.00) (100)
Suitability 45 39 4 7 95
(47.37) (41.05) (L21) (7.37) (100)
Reputation 14 55 18 8 95
(14.74) (57.90) (18.95) (8.42) (100)
Labour intensity 2 4 21 68 95
(2.11) (4.21) (22.11) (71.58) (100)
Source: Calculated from Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
Note: figures in parenthesis are percentage.
Table 3.8 shows the comparison between this study and an Indian study. The 
results of these two studies are quite similar. The most important criterion in 
choosing foreign technology is that the technology should be the most advanced. This 
criterion had an average ranking of 1.4 for this study and 3.0 for the Indian study, 
being equivalent to very important. This is followed by two other criteria, ' technology 
should be suitable to local conditions' and that 'the technology supplier should be 
world-famous and well-founded'. The criterion that ‘the technology should be 
inexpensive' turned out to be 'fairly important' for this study and 'somewhat important'
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for the Indian study. The criterion that 'the technology should be labour-intensive' 
was however cited as largely irrelevant by the enterprises in both countries.
Table 3.8 Weighted Average Scores Received for Each 
Criterion: China and India
Criterion Weighted Average
This study Indian study
Cheapness (Inexpensive) 2.8 0.8a
Advancement (Latest breakthrough) 1.4 3.0a
Suitability (Appropriate to local condition) 1.7 1.6a
Reputation (Seller’s reputation) 2.2 2.0a
Labour intensity (Labour intensity) 3.6 0.0a
Notes: criteria used in the Indian study are in parenthesis;
a. scores for the Indian study are not directly comparable with those of this study due to the 
adoption of a different scoring method. In the Indian study, 3 = very important; 2 = important; 1 = 
somewhat important; and 0 = not important.
Source: Calculated from Table B.3 in Appendix B for this study and Table 4.13 from Deolalikar and 
Sundaram (1989:104).
We now turn to the correlation and regression test results. Table 3.9 shows pair­
wise correlations where CH is significantly associated with both SAL and LogSAL at 
the 10 per cent level, but not with RDE and LogJRDE.
Table 3.9 (Log)-Linear Correlation Analyses: Associations Between 
Independent and Dependent Variables*
RDE SAL LogRDE LogSAL CH
RDE 1.000
SAL 0.276b 1.000
LogRDE 0.700a 0.465a 1.000
LogSAL 0.339b 0.755a 0.650a 1.000
CH 0.038 0.242c 0.132 0.230c 1.000
* The correlations are based on data on 95 enterprises in China's machine building industry;
SAL -  the level of sales, used as a measure of enterprise size;
RDE = R&D expenditures;
LogSAL = logarithm of the level of sales;
LogRDE -  logarithm of R&D expenditures;
CH = cheapness of foreign technology.
Coefficients marked a, b, and c are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
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For the dependent variable CH, the probit and logit coefficients of SAL are 
significant at the 3 and 2 per cent levels respectively with positive signs, whereas 
neither probit nor logit coefficient of RDE is significant. These findings are also held 
for LogSAL and LogRDE. The probit and logit coefficients of LogSAL are significant 
at the 3 and 2 per cent levels respectively with positive signs. When used together, 
LogRDE still performed badly while the probit and logit coefficients of LogSAL are 
significant at the same (5 per cent) significant level. The constant term is significant in 
equations (i) and (v) for both probit and logit models with negative signs for the probit 
constant and positive signs for the logit constant and (ii) and (iii) only for logit model 
with positive signs.
Table 3.10 Probit and Logit analyses Explaining CH in Chinese 
Machine-Building Enterprises: 1985-1991*
Probit analysis Logit analysis
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
(i) Constant -.285g -1.834 0.374a 6.254
SAL 0.138c 2.223 0.558b 2.404
(ii) Constant -.141 -0.966 0.444a 7.633
RDE 0.199 0.320 0.795 0.316
(iii) Constant -.465b -2.284 0.322a 4.205
LogSAL 0.202c 2.224 0.773b 2.275
(iv) Constant -.421 -1.563 0.336a 3.225
LogRDE 0.917 1.285 0.356 1.281
(v) Constant -.567d -2.089 0.285a 1.281
LogSAL 0.233e 1.971 0.879e 1.993
LogRDE 0.836 0.089 0.251 0.070
*The regressions are based on data of 95 enterprises in China's machine building industry that all 
undertake R&D activities.
SAL = the level of sales, used as measure of enterprise size;
RDE = R&D expenditures;
LogSWZ, = logarithm of SAL;
LogRDE = logarithm of RDE;
CH = a dummy variable, cheapness of technology.
Coefficients marked a, b, c, d, e, and g are significantly different fi-om zero at the 1 (or
less than 1), 2, 3,4, 5, and 7 per cent levels, respectively.
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The positive signs for SAL and Log&4Z in both models suggest that the 
probability that a large enterprise considers CH important is greater than a small 
enterprise. This finding is the same as that for UN.
5.3 Sources for Information on Foreign Technology to be Imported
Analyses of SOEs' technological behaviour in terms of the sources of information on 
foreign technology are based on Table B.4 in Appendix B and given in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11 Sources of Information on Foreign Technology
Source Very
important
Important Fairly
important
Un­
important
Total
Factory director’s visits abroad 29 38 12 16 95
(30.53) (40.00) (12.63) (16.84) (100)
R&D personnel’s visits abroad 53 29 7 6 95
(55.79) (30.53) (7.37) (6.32) (100)
Industrial and commercial exhibition 10 50 20 15 95
(10.53) (52.63) (21.05) (15.79) (100)
Technical consultation 8 40 22 25 95
(8.42) (42.11) (23.16) (26.32) (100)
Professional trade journal 2 30 31 32 95
(2.11) (31.58) (32.63) (33.68) (100)
Technology suppliers 14 41 19 21 95
(14.74) (43.16) (20.00) (22.11) (100)
Source: Calculated from Table B.4 in Appendix B.
Note: figures in parentheses are percentage.
Table 3.11 shows that ‘R&D personnel's visits abroad’ is considered very 
important by more than half of the 95 SOEs. Even if the first two scales are combined, 
this consideration will still be the most highly ranked.
Combining the first two scales, it is found that except for the ‘professional trade 
journals’, the rest of the sources are all considered important, which means that as a 
result of economic structural reforms, enterprises have begun to use various possible 
sources to obtain technology information so as to enhance the quality of their 
decisions made in relation to technology import.
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Table 3.12 compares the scores obtained in this study and in the Indian study. 
There are wide differences in the rankings. For Chinese enterprises, the highest 
ranking is for factory R&D personnel's visits abroad, whereas for Indian SOEs, 
professional trade journals were ranked most important. Table 3.12 also shows that 
the Indian SOEs used fewer sources than their Chinese counterparts. For example, two 
sources - R&D personnel's visits abroad and technology suppliers - were reportedly 
non-existent in the Indian study.
Table 3.12 Weighted Average Scores Received for Each 
Source: Chiua aud ludia
Source This study Indian study
Factory direct visits abroad
(frequent trips abroad by Chief Executive) 2.2 3
Factory R&D personnel’s visits abroad
(Frequent trips abroad by R&D people) 1.6 -
Industrial and commercial exhibitions
(Industrial exhibition) 2.4 2
Technical consultation
(Private consultants) 2.7 2
Professional trade journals
(Professional trade journals) 3.0 1
Technology suppliers
(Parent company) 2.5 -
Notes: sources used in the Indian study are in parenthesis and two sets of weighted 
averages are directly comparable.
Source: Calculated from Table B.4 in Appendix B for this study and the Table 4.11 from 
Deolalikar and Sundaram(1989:102).
Correlation and regression tests were tried with all endogenous variables 
discussed above and the results show that none of the endogenous variables is 
influenced by SOEs' size and technological effort.
With the questionnaire survey data, we have discussed in this chapter the 
enterprises decision-making process in relation to technology choice. A logical 
question to ask is: what has happened when Chinese industrial SOEs imported 
technology? This will be the topic of the next chapter on the effect of technology 
transfer on enterprise indigenous technological capabilities.
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Chapter 4 Effects of Technology Transfer on the 
Enterprises’ Technological Capabilities
4.1 Introduction
Many of the earlier studies on technology transfer assumed that Third World countries 
possessed very limited technological capabilities and that they relied passively on 
imported technologies.^ More recently, however, this has been challenged partly in
view of the rapid rise of the newly industrialising countries (NICs).^ Attention has 
shifted to examining the effects of technology transfer on local firms’ technological 
capabilities.
This chapter will examine the effects of technology transfer in China’s machine- 
building industry on the technological capabilities of the importing enterprises. 
Section 4.2 will survey the findings of some recent studies. Section 4.3 will discuss 
the procedures for further tests, while Section 4.4 will deal with the data to be used.
 ^ This assumption entered the literature in rather extreme form as the following quotation from 
Cardoso (1980) makes clear:
Basically the dependency situation is maintained because, in addition to the already stated 
factors of direct control by the multinationals and dependence on the external markets, the 
industrial sector develops in an incomplete form. The production goods sector (Department 
1), which is the centre-pin of accumulation in a central economy, does not develop fully. 
Ordinarily, economists refer to ‘technological dependency’ and it means that the economy has 
to import machines and industrial inputs, and consequently has to stimulate exports 
(especially of primary goods) to generate the necessary foreign exchange.
Even the perceptive Rosenberg (1976), who would not claim to have been influenced by dependency 
theory, was of the opinion that the third world was technologically dormant in many important 
respects:
Many of the major innovations in Western technology have emerged in the capital goods 
sector of the economy. But underdeveloped countries with little or no organised domestic 
capital goods sector simply have not had the opportunity to make capital-saving innovations 
because they have not had the capital goods industry necessary for them. Under these 
circumstances, such countries have typically imported their capital goods from abroad, but 
this has meant that they have not developed the technological base of skills, knowledge, 
facilities, and organisation upon which further technical progress so largely depends.
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and the results will be presented in Section 4.5. The last section will look at sampled 
SOEs’ growth with reference to their technological activities.
4.2 Studies on Technological Capabilities
Foreign technologies tend to be large scale, capital-intensive and designed for high- 
income consumers’ markets. They are not well suited to the economical environment 
of the less developed countries. Thus, some modification and adjustment of the 
imported technologies are often required (Stewart, 1977). Furthermore, technology 
suppliers possess some information about the use of technologies that is tacit and not 
embodied in capital goods nor laid down in blueprints, training, etc. This implies that 
the process of assimilating and reproducing foreign technologies requires local firms 
to solve numerous problems (Nelson, 1978). This assimilation and reproduction of 
technology involve a process of technological change, however small.
4.2.1 Studies on Third World technological capabilities
A few studies (Mytelka, 1978 and Pillai, 1979) suggest that foreign technologies have 
rather little impact on indigenous technological capabilities. However, a number of 
other studies found that imported technologies have encouraged local firms' 
technological efforts. These latter include case studies and econometric tests.
A notable case study describes the evolution of Usiminas, one of the three largest 
state-owned integrated steel mills in Brazil. Dahlman (1979 and 1984) and Dahlman 
and Fonseca (1987) showed that faced with certain conditions, including tight 
government budget and economic recession, etc., technology imports greatly helped 
Usiminas in cost reduction and product diversification. Similar results were found in a
^Such as the Asian Four Tiger - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan in Asia; and 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America.
65
study on the technological behaviour of a Mexican steel firm, Altos Homos de 
Mexico S.A. (AHMSA) by Perez and Peniche (1987). Imports of the machinery and 
process technology helped AHMSA in solving a number of problems embodied in the 
original design.
Positive impacts of technology imports were also found in James’ (1988) study of 
the Mexican metal engineering and petrochemical firms. Maxwell's (1987) study of 
the evolution of an Argentina's largest private, nationally owned steel plant - Acindar 
S.A. and Katz et al's study (1987) of an Argentinean rayon plant, Ducilo Argentina S. 
A.. These have shown that firms’ technological capabilities can be raised by imported 
technologies even in the face of economic distortions and irrationalities, and some of 
them could reach right out to the ' technological frontier'.
The econometric studies have examined the relationship between technology 
imports and indigenous technological capabilities. Lall (1983) found that the 
expenditures on R&D of Indian engineering firms were positively related to the 
payments for imported technologies. Katrak (1989) found that among Indian 
enterprises the level of R&D expenditures was higher among the importers than the 
non-importers while Katrak (1990), taking into consideration the type of technologies 
imported, found that the technological efforts were higher in the enterprises whose 
technology imports were aimed at strengthening their in-house technological 
capabilities, but lower in those enterprises that had negotiated an exclusive right of 
sale in the home market.
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Copious literature on the impact of technology transfer on indigenous 
technological capabilities of Asian newly industrialising countries exists, showing the 
positive effect of foreign technologies on indigenous technological capabilities.
Linsu Kim and his associates(1990, 1987, 1985) showed that although Korea’s 
economic progress may be attributed to a number of economic, social and 
technological factors, the most important of all is technological capabilities gained by 
‘apprentices’ and ‘imitators’ of technologies imported by means of turnkey plants, 
FDI and packaged licensings. Chudnovsky and Nagao (1986), when studying the 
development of Korea’s capital goods sector, pointed out that, ‘ [The] technology 
needed for facilitating the development of indigenous producers of capital goods has 
been mostly obtained through licensing agreements. In 1977-80 332 agreements in the 
machinery sector were approved, which accounted for 34 per cent of all agreements 
(974) approved in Korea in that period.’
An econometric study of the relationship between technology imports and R&D 
efforts of Korean manufacturing firms by Jaymin Lee (1996) showed that firms 
importing technology tend to commit themselves to R&D efforts and among firms 
with formal R&D institutes, technology imports have non-complementary 
relationship with R&D efforts.
Martin Fransman (1982) reported an improvement of technological capabilities of 
Hong Kong machine manufacturers. Examples of adaptation and modification of 
imported machines included: the performance of new functions by the machine, 
economising on raw materials and energy requirements, an increase in output per unit
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of time, a change in the source of power (for example, from diesel to electricity), a 
change in the size and shape of the machine to save factory space and a change to 
response to rising real wages. In his case study of technological capability in the 
capital goods sector in Singapore, Martin Fransman (1984) concluded that all 19 
interviewed machine producers^ possessed an in-house capability for product change 
and contributed more than their foreign counterparts to the stock of technological 
capabilities in Singapore. Taiwanese firms exhibited similar technological capabilities 
(Martin Fransman: 1986).^
4.2.2 Studies on Chinese enterprises’ technological capabilities 
A common feature of these studies is that the importing countries are market 
economies, allowing inter-firm competition, though some, like India, have had 
government intervention in terms of licensing controls and foreign trade restrictions 
and the government has also played the role of an entrepreneur. This therefore gives 
rise to a question: Could these research findings be generalised to the transitional 
Chinese socialist economy?
In all socialist economies the state is the main, if not the sole, entrepreneur, 
determining the direction and pattern of resource allocation, as well as other aspects of 
production, and the application of new technologies ( Poznanski, 1985; Shigeru 
Ishikawa, 1988). Individual enterprises have neither the power nor the incentives to 
introduce technological changes on their own initiative. Given the existence of the 
'soft budget constraint', analysed by Komai (1979, 1980b), state-owned enterprises do 
not have the pressures to actively engage in product and/or process innovations. In
 ^According to the author, all the important machine-tool makers in Singapore were included in his 
sample.
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contrast, in market economies private enterprises’ desire to increase profits is the 
motive force for technological development, though governments assist with basic 
research and development programmes and educational infrastructure.^
In China, economic liberalisation has greatly transformed the relationship 
between the state and enterprises in terms of control (Ma Hong, 1983; Byrd, 1983, 
1987a, 1987b, 1991, 1992; Byrd and Tidrick, 1987; Perkins, 1988; Tidrick and Chen, 
1987; ) Chossudovsky, 1986). The government controls the economy at the macro 
level and allows market forces to play a major role in determining what, how, and for 
whom enterprises produce. Government monopoly on foreign trade has been replaced 
by newly granted authority to SOEs to engage in foreign trade by themselves 
(Pomfret, 1991; Lardy, 1992; Panagariya, 1993). Also government control on foreign 
exchange is lifted by establishing Foreign Exchange Swap Centres. China's S&T 
structure has also been experiencing slowly but firmly institutional and managerial 
changes since 1981 (Saich, 1986; Baark, 1987; Conroy, 1989; Simon, 1989; Hu 
Yiaoxing, 1993): Firstly, S&T personnel are encouraged to 'moonlight'; secondly, 
S&T institutes are encouraged to integrate with medium-sized and large SOEs or even 
to convert into enterprise-like organisations. These changes are expected to facilitate 
the adaptation, assimilation, diffusion of foreign technologies and generation of new 
technologies.
The effects of a large increase in the imports of foreign technologies in China at 
the aggregate national level has been studied by Hongxin Zhao (1995). Based on time
^For example, it is said that, ' Taiwanese producers were able to make substantial improvements by 
using the technology developed elsewhere', Fransman (1986: 203).
Sgee chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion about China's foreign trade regime and science and 
technology management system.
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series data, he showed that imported technology has significantly enhanced China’s 
technological build-up and is positively correlated with R&D and spending on 
technical upgrading and output value of heavy industry and its export value. However, 
the effects of imported technologies on the technological capabilities of enterprises, 
especially SOEs, have not been studied at the enterprise level, though a few anecdotal 
reports showed some positive effects. More detailed studies are therefore desirable 
particularly in view of the negative effect of earlier imports of Soviet technologies, 
capital goods and technical personnel (Chu-yuan Cheng, 1971).
4.3 Enterprise Technological Efforts, Technology Imports, Enterprise Size and 
Institutional Influences
4.3.1 Enterprise technological efforts and imports o f foreign technology 
Various indicators of technology imports were used in earlier studies, such as 
royalties and technical fees (Lall, 1983), expenditures on the imports of capital and 
non-capital equipment (Katrak, 1985) and the number of technological collaboration 
agreements effected (Katrak, 1990). My survey of enterprises failed to obtaining data 
on their payments for imported capital and non-capital equipment and royalties and 
technical fees. Data on technology imports available to us is the number of 
technological collaboration agreements for a period of thirteen years: 1979 - 91. This 
period was further divided into two periods: 1979-84 and 1985-91. Technology 
imports for the period 1985-91 are measured by the logarithm of the number of 
technology collaboration agreements, LogNUM; and a dummy variable, B85, is used 
for the period 1979-84, taking the value 1 if an enterprise imported technologies 
during the period and 0 otherwise.
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There are two considerations about the use of B85\ firstly, enterprises did not 
have to provide data on the number of technology imports before 1985 if they had any 
difficulty finding them; and secondly, no corresponding data on R&D expenditures 
and sales revenue were collected over the same period. A new variable, designed to 
see if past technology imports have any effects on the present R&D expenditures, 
was obtained as LogNUM85 = LogNUM x B85.
It is necessary at this stage to consider import-related issues and their relations 
with the enterprise R&D expenditures. It has been widely noticed that technology 
suppliers may impose restrictions on the importer (Subrahmanian, 1984). One may 
expect that restrictions on export by the importer may encourage in-house 
technological efforts. Restrictions on export may force enterprises to conduct more 
adaptive R&D to adjust imported technologies to suit domestic market conditions, 
including income levels and tastes or to scale down (or up in Chinese case) imported 
technologies to suit the level of domestic demand (Stewart, 1977).
The effects of tie-in sales may be determined by the nature of technologies 
embodied in machinery and equipment that must be purchased by the importer as a 
precondition of its importing technologies. If new (for the importer) technologies are 
embodied in tie-in sales, a positive effect may be expected on in-house R&D activity. 
However, if conventional technologies are embodied, a negative effect may be 
expected.
The importer may negotiate the exclusive right of sales(ERS) of products made 
with the imported technologies. It is argued (Katrak, 1990) that ERS may have
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positive effect on in-house technological efforts by spreading R&D expenditures over 
a large volume of output, but it may also have negative effect by restricting actual or 
potential domestic competition. The net outcome of these two opposing influences 
may vary from case to case. Research findings show that in the Indian case, the 
expenditures on R&D is lower in enterprises with the exclusive right of sales 
(Katrak, 1990). Lack of studies of this kind in China's situation makes it difficult to 
say what effect ERS will have on enterprises' R&D expenditures.
Certain characteristics of imported technologies may also affect in-house 
technological efforts. Technology imports for introducing new products and/or 
processes may have rather limited effect on in-house R&D, while imports for 
strengthening or complementing in-house technological capabilities are likely to have 
more effect. Generally speaking, Chinese industrial enterprises have been more likely 
to import "hardware" rather than "software" owing to the limited development of in- 
house R&D and traditional S&T management systems. This type of technology 
imports may have little effect on R&D expenditures.
4.3.2 Enterprise technological efforts and type o f enterprise.
Diversification of firms' activities may be of great significance in understanding firms' 
R&D expenditures (Comanor, 1965: 182 - 91, Grabowski, 1968: 292 -305, 
McEachem and Romeo, 1978: 349 - 61 and Scherer, 1965:1097 - 125). A study (Link 
and Long, 1981) aiming at testing Nelson's diversification hypothesis (Nelson, 1959) 
showed a positive relationship between the firm's R&D intensity and product 
diversification.
72
In pre-reform China, product diversification was found mainly in the 
"omniproductive" or comprehensive enterprises, or as termed by Chinese, Da Er 
Quan, Xiao Er Quart. These enterprises were expected to produce practically all they 
needed for the purpose of transforming inputs into outputs. In the post-reform period 
product diversification is actively encouraged by the government. Competitive 
pressures and supply factors motivate enterprises to diversify. A study of a Chinese
iron and steel complex showed that the shortage of iron ores^ and the surplus 
employees, including production workers and R&D personnel, were two main reasons 
for diversification (Dong Yizheng 1993:34).
The Link and Long study used a diversification index, DIV, which was 
formulated to reflect the number of markets served by each firm. Our survey asked 
enterprises to report the number of their products: PRONUM. A dummy variable, 
MULDUCT, will also be used.
4.3.3 Enterprise technological efforts and size
The relationship between an enterprise’s technological efforts and its size follows the 
hypothesis, attributed to Schumpter (1950) and Galbraith (1952), that large firms are 
more than proportionately innovative than small firms, because of economies of scale 
in research and development. Kamien and Schwartz pointed out two important 
sources of these alleged economies: ( 1 ) the higher productivity and therefore lower 
cost, brought about by reduced effort in arriving at a solution due to colleagues' new 
insights or special familiarity with a problem, by the division of labour among 
researchers, by the adequate use of special equipment, and by the increase of the
^Before the reforms, the shortage of iron ores, or any other factors of production, could be eliminated 
by the unified state supply of raw materials from other iron and steel enterprises.
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chances of serendipitous discoveries; and (2 ) the superior ability that large firms have 
to exploit the output of their research efforts (Kamien and Schwartz,1982:32). The 
second source of these alleged economies was explained more than three and half 
decades ago by Nelson (1959) who noticed the important role of a large firm's 
reputation and established name in helping it open a new market for an unforeseen 
product.
In spite of the positive effects of firm size, it is also argued (Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1982) that unexpected research findings may be ignored in large firms and 
R&D personnel may be ill-motivated due to irrational payment systems. Large firms 
may also suffer more fi*om internal bureaucratic control, and that may discourage 
innovative activity (Nelson and Winter, 1980).
Various writers (Kamien and Schwartz 1981 and Katrak, 1984) argued that the 
net effect of firm size on innovation activities must be subject to empirical tests rather 
than a priori reasoning. A large quantity of empirical research has been done to test 
the Schumpterian hypothesis, using either input measures, such as R&D expenditures, 
output measures such as patents, and various measures of firm size, such as sales, 
value of assets, or number of employees. Results of empirical studies vary from direct 
support to conditional justification and refutation of the hypothesis (Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1981).
Intensive empirical studies along this line for firms in Third World countries 
have been done by Katrak among others using R&D expenditures as the dependent 
variable and sales revenue as the independent variable in both correlation and 
regression analyses, he found that large Indian manufacturing enterprises did not
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undertake proportionately more R&D on average than small ones (Katrak, 1985:224; 
1989:134; and 1990).
4.3.4 Enterprise technological efforts and institutional influences 
This study will test the effects of technology imports, enterprise type, size and some 
institutional factors, relevant in the context of post-reform China, on enterprise’s 
technological efforts.
Even after two decades economic reforms, state-owned enterprises in China 
are still subject to informal control by state authorities and are in a condition of "dual 
dependence" on both markets and the state (Komai, 1987). It is too early to say what 
effects the new policy of a "socialist market economy", as promulgated at the 14th 
Party National Congress in 1992, will have on SOEs economic behaviour. It thus 
seems desirable to include in our regression model variables indicating ownership and 
affiliation that may capture the influences of institutional control over the SOEs.
Ownership variable. The ownership effect on R&D expenditures will be 
tested by using a dummy, OWN, which will takes the value 1 if the enterprise is 
state-owned and 0 otherwise. A significant positive sign for OWN will infer that state- 
owned enterprises have higher R&D expenditures, because of government funding.
Affiliation variables. Given the pre-reform highly centralised financial 
system, key SOEs affiliated to ministries had been favoured compared to their local
counterparts^. Thus, it is expected that affiliation may still influence enterprise’s 
R&D expenditures during post-reform era. To test this, three affiliation dummies are 
introduced into our regression model: AF, AFP, and AFM. The first affiliation
^For example, the traditional practice was that SOEs handed in all profits, depreciation funds, etc. to 
the central government, which in turn determined the needs of SOEs for financial resources for 
carrying out planned R&D activities, among other things.
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dummy variable takes the value 1  if an enterprise affiliates to a ministry and 0  
otherwise. The same also applies to the second and third affiliation dummies. 
Significant positive signs for these dummies will imply that an enterprise’s R&D 
expenditures are partly dependent on its affiliation.
43,5 Regression model
The multiple log-linear equation to be employed is as follows:
LogRDE = Po + Pi LogNUM + P2  LogNUMB85 +P3 LogSAL+ P4 EX 
+ P5 RES + PJIS + P7 ERS + Ps TTI + P9 PRONUM 
+ P PRONUMB85 + P OWN + P AF + p AFP 
+% A F M  " " "
4.4 The Data
The data employed were obtained through questionnaires collected with the 
help of a department of China Survey Service (CSS). Detailed descriptions of 
questionnaire and the data set used in this study can be found in Appendix A. Some 
important data problems are discussed here.
4.4.1 Measuring size
Sales revenue is employed as a measure of size. This has limitations. Government 
policies, e.g. import restrictions, licensing of productive capacity, etc. may affect sales 
revenue and in addition, in China, sales are also affected by state output targets and 
controlled prices. An alternative measure of enterprise size is employment. This 
measure is, however, not error free since it may be affected by government restrictions 
on the displacement of labour and moreover, the labour reform of SOEs precipitated
in the mid-1980s renders employment a rather unreliable measure of size.^ A further
^For example, the power was given to managers in the mid-1980s to rationalize enteprise workforce as 
an effort to improve productivity. Workers taken out of production for various reasons were re­
organized into collective enterprises engaged mainly in service activities related either to the 
enterprises where these workers came ot to other enterprises. Thus, ambiguity arose in employment
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indicator would be the value of assets of the enterprise. This, however, is also a 
problematic measure in China: the traditional practice of depreciation of fixed assets 
and the continued use of machinery and equipment whose book values are zero makes 
many medium-sized and large enterprises appear to "empty shell".
4.4.2 Measuring technology imports
The number of technological collaboration agreements (NUM) may be used as an 
indicator of technology imports. A problem with this is that different agreements may 
differ in their importance to the enterprise; and there is no practical way to weigh each 
agreement by its importance.
Alternative measures would be payments for royalties and technical fees or 
payments for capital and non-capital imports (Katrak, 1985). However, it was not 
possible to obtain data for these measures. And capital and non-capital imports may 
contain a large proportion of conventional technology that requires little, if any, in- 
house R&D efforts.
4.4.3 Measuring technological efforts
In principle, the enterprise technological effort may be measured in terms of an 
input or output variable. The enterprise’s R&D personnel, or R&D expenditures are 
examples of an input measure, while patents are an output measure.
Shortcomings associated with R&D input measures, as discussed by Fransman
(1984), is that the efficiency of R&D inputs may vary fi*om enterprise to enterprise. 
This is especially so for socialist enterprises under "soft budget constraint"; their 
R&D expenditures may be subject to the bargaining between the state and the
statistics: some enterprises take rationalized-out workers still as a part of their total labour force while 
other enterprises exclude these workers from their total workforce. The obvious inconsistency will
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enterprise. Furthermore, as Freeman (1971) and Pavitt (1984) have pointed out, any 
inventive work undertaken by an enterprise outside its formal R&D structure will not 
be reported in the R&D input statistics. In the case of China, this means that inventive 
work undertaken by rank and file employees voluntarily and in their spare time can 
not be captured by the enterprise R&D statistics.
An alternative measure of technological effort is the number of R&D personnel 
employed. Our questionnaire survey asked enterprises to provide data of the number 
of engineers and technicians employed. The results obtained with this data are 
reported in Appendix C. Two shortcomings of this data need to be noted. First, we do 
not know how many of these personnel were actually involved in R&D activities. 
Secondly, as Fransman (1984) has pointed out, it is the efficiency of the R&D 
personnel's work rather than their number, or formal qualification, that matters.
4,5 The Empirical Results
The tests were initially tried with all of the variables discussed above. However, eight 
of the variables, AF, AFM, AFP, EX, RES, TIS, ERS and TTI, showed no 
relationship with the dependent variable and so their results are not reported here. 
Particularly, the ownership dummy was even not included in any of our tests. The 
reason for this omission is that observations on collectively owned enterprises (COE) 
are fewer than sufficient for meaningful statistical tests designed initially. The lack of 
relationship between the dependent variable, E&D expenditures, and the affiliation 
dummies shows that the absence of government funding in SOEs’ R&D and therefore 
the possible distortion of SOEs’ R&D expenditures during the post-reform era.
make employment as a measure of size unreliable. In addition, the hiring of nonregular employees 
further aggravated the statistical problem.
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Table 4.2. Log-Linear Correlations: R&D Expenditures in Technology - Importing 
Enterprises in Chinese Machine-Building Industry and 
Independent Variables* , 1985 - 1991
LogRDE LOGSAL B85 MULDUCT LGPRONUM
LOGRDE 1 . 0 0 0
LOGSAL .650a 1 . 0 0 0
B85 .284a .195c 1 . 0 0 0
MULDUCT .539a .276b .116 1 . 0 0 0
LGPRONUM .430a .236b .055 .840a 1 . 0 0 0
* The correlations are based on data of 95 technology-importing enterprises in Chinese 
machine-building industry and they also undertake R&D.
LOGRDE = logarithm of R&D expenditures,
LOGSAL = logarithm of sales revenue,
B85 = a dummy variable taking the value 1 if an enterprise also had collaboration 
agreements before 1985 and 0 if the enterprise did not,
MULDUCT = a dummy variable taking the value 1 if an enterprise is a multiproduct SOE 
and 0  otherwise (uniproduct enterprise),
LGPRONUM = logarithm of number of products produced currently by an enterprise.
Correlations marked a, b, and c are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively.
Table 4.2 shows the pair-wise log-linear correlations, based on the data of 95 
state-owned enterprises in the Chinese machine-building industry. The R&D 
expenditures are significantly correlated with each of the other variables at the 1  per 
cent level of significance. There are also some correlations between the independent 
variables, particularly MULDUCT and LGPRONUM ( significant at the 1 per cent 
level). As is well known, some association between explanatory variables might 
affect their performance in the multiple regression analyses. We will consider this 
problem later.
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Table 4.3. Log-Linear Regression Equations Explaining R&D Expenditures in Technology- 
Importing Enterprises in Chinese Machine-Building Industry*, 1985 - 1991
Eq. Constant LOGSAL B85 MULDUCT LGPRONUM R2
(i) 1 .6 6 a .77a .60c .436
(6.76) (7.82) (2.07)
(ii) 1.08a .64a .51c 1.42a .567
(4.48) (7.22) (2.08) (5.37)
(iii) 1 .2 1 a .6 8 a .59b .60a .512
(4.75) (7.28) (2.19) (3.92)
* The log-linear regressions are based on data of 95 technology-importing machine-building 
enterprises in China and they also undertake R&D.
LogSAL = logarithm of sales revenue,
B85 =a dummy variable taking the value 1 if an enterprise also had collaboration agreements 
before 1985 and 0 otherwise,
MULDUCT = a dummy variable taking the value 1 if  an enterprise is a multi-product 
enterprise and 0  otherwise,
LGPRONUM = logarithm of the number of products produced currently by an enterprise.
Coefficients marked a, b, and c, are significantly from zero at the 1, 3, and 5 per cent levels, 
respectively. The t-values are shown in parentheses.
Table 4.3 reports the log-linear regression results. Equation (i) includes the 
terms, LogSAL and B85 while (ii) also employs MULDUCT and equation (iii) has 
PRONUM. The coefficients of LogSAL, B85, MULDUCT, and LGPRONUM are all 
significant with positive signs respectively in all equations. The constant term is 
significant with positive signs in all three equations. The overall performance of the 
model is fairly satisfactory as it explains 44 and 57 per cent of the inter-enterprise 
variation in LogRDE.
The interpretation of these results is a s follows. The positive sign for B85 
indicates that the R&D expenditures are higher in the enterprises that had entered into 
technology collaboration agreements before 1985. This supports the argument about a 
possible time-lag between imports of foreign technology and corresponding R&D 
activities. The positive sign for MULDUCT, in equation (ii), means that the R&D
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expenditures are higher in the enterprises that manufacture different products. This 
suggests the economies of scale.
A further interesting result is that the coefficient of LogSAL in all three 
equations is less than unity. This shows that a one per cent increase in enterprise sales 
induces a less than one per cent increase in enterprise R&D expenditures. This finding 
is similar to that for another developing country, namely India, by Katrak ( 1991).
It seems desirable to examine further the role of the dummy variables. Do they 
influence the 'R&D intensity', i.e. (RD/SAL) in addition to the level of R&D 
expenditures. The regression results are as follows:
LogRDS = 1.08 - .36 LogSAL + .51 B85 + 1.42 MULDUCT R^  = .28
(4.48) (4.00) (2.01) (5.37)
when we include MULDUCT and
LogRDS = 1.21 - .32 LogSAL + .59 B85 + .61 LogPRONUM R^  = .19
(4.76) (3.37) (2.19) (3.92)
when we have PRONUM.
Next, let us test of stability and consistency of our model. We divided the whole 
period 1985-91 into two three-year periods, 1985-87 and 1989-91. The regression for 
the latter period is.
LogRDE8991 = -0.508 + .639 LogSAL8991 + .643 B85 + 1.672 MULDUCT R^  = .541
(-1.201) (6.337) (2.259) (5.683)
where LogRDE8991 and LogSAL8991 denote respectively logarithms of average 
R&D expenditures and sales revenues over the period of 1989-91, and B85 and 
MULDUCT are as defined above. The ^-values in parentheses for all these variables 
are significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent or better levels. Compared with
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equation (ii) in Table 4.3 (see Table 4.4), we found the result is more or less the same 
except the difference between the intercept terms.
Table 4.4. Comparison of Model for the Period 1985 - 91 and Model 
for the Period of 1989 - 91*
Variable** Model (1985-91) Model(1989-91)
Constant 1.08a -0.51
LogSAL 0.64a 0.64a
B85 0.51c 0.64b
MULDUCT 1.42a 1.67a
Adiusted R^ .567 .541
* The log-linear regressions are based on data of 95 technology-importing 
enterprises in China's machine-building industry and they also conduct 
R&D activity.
** Variables are as defined above
Coefficients marked a, b, and c are significantly different from zero at 1, 3, and 5 per cent levels 
respectively.
Finally, based on the above division of our survey period, we examine for the 
possible influence of a time-lag. The regression result is.
LogRDE8991 = -0.397 + .656 LogSAL8587 + . 6 6 8  B85 + 1.590 MULDUCT R^  = .554
(-1.003) (6.622) (2.384) (5.429)
where the dependent variable is for 1989-91, LogSAL8587 is for the period 1985-87 
and the other variables are as defined above. The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
The coefficients for both LogSAL8587 and MULDUCT are significantly different 
from zero at the 1 per cent level, while the coefficient for B85 is significantly different 
from zero at the 2 per cent level. As in the above regression equation, the intercept 
term in this one is also insignificant and negatively signed. The expected range for 
LogSAL8587 is .401 to 1.026, also significantly less than unity.
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4.6 Growth o f State-owned Enterprises
Imports of technology are inputs that SOEs need to survive and grow. But have the 
imports of technology helped SOEs’ growth? Following Evans (1987) recent study on 
firm growth, the growth of SOEs is defined as
Growth = Ln [EMP,, / EMPJ/ [ f  -t] 
where EMP denotes SOEs’ employment size, f  is the date to which the 1991 data 
apply, t is the date to which the 1985 data apply, and f  - t is the number of years 
between these two dates.
SOEs growth is represented by the following regression equation.
[In EMP,, - In EMP,]/c? = In g(EMP„ MULDUCT, EMPMU) + u, 
where EMP and MULDUCT are as defined above, EMPMU is defined as EMP x 
MULDUCT, f  > t, d = f  - 1, g is growth function which we shall approximate by 
taking logs, and u is a normally distributed disturbance term with mean zero and 
constant variance across observations. The regression results are summarised in Table
4.5 below.
Table 4.5 Regression Results for SOEs Growth: 1985 - 91
Equation Constant EMPLOG MULDUCT EMPMU
(i) 0.191a -0.023b 0.046
(2.279) (-2.119)
(ii) 0.188a -0 .0 2 1 c -0.031d 0.068
(2.251) (-1.840) (-1.429)
(iii) 0.181e -0 .0 2 2 e -0.6844E-6f 0.046
(1.659) (-1.438) (-0.160)
Source: The log-linear regressions are based on data of 95 technology-importing enterprises in 
China's machine-building industry and they also conduct R&D activity.
Coefficients marked a, b, c, d, e, and f, are significantly different from zero at the 3, 4, 
7,15, and 87 per cent levels, respectively. The t-values are shown in parentheses.
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The key finding is that SOE growth decreases at a diminishing rate with SOE 
size, which is shown by a negative sign in firont of the coefficients of EMPLOG. This 
pattern is broadly consistent with Evans’ (1987) finding in his study of firm growth 
for the United States. The main finding is that the growth of the diversifying SOEs 
decreases, as shown by the negative sign in front of the coefficient of the dummy 
variable, MULDUCT, which implies that imports of technology do not lead to SOEs’ 
growth. Such finding can be explained by the inappropriate technologies imported as 
a result of wrong decisions made by SOEs and influenced by central/local 
governments policies regarding SOEs management in general and technology transfer 
in particular.
This chapter has examined how Chinese machine-building SOEs’ in-house 
technological efforts were influenced by technology imports, enterprises size and 
product diversification. As we mentioned earlier, technological efforts can be 
examined by an output measure, namely patent. In the next chapter we will examine 
the patenting behaviour of Chinese machine-building enterprises in relation to 
technology transfer.
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Chapter 5 Enterprise Patenting Behaviour
The objective of this chapter is to analyse Chinese enterprises' technological capabilities. 
The measure used will be their patents. We first look briefly at the development of 
China’s patent system, and review previous studies of patenting.
5.1 Development o f Chinais patent system
1985 saw the enactment of China's first patent law since liberalisation. The aim was to 
cater for the acceleration of China's economic reforms, protect intellectual property and 
facilitate China's technology imports. ^
In 1997 an aggregate of 114,208 patent applications were registered, a 694 per cent 
increase over 1985; 50,992 patent applications were awarded, representing a 36,850 per 
cent increase over 1985. Table C.l and C.2 in Appendix C give patent statistics by 
applicant for the period 1985 - 97. Comparison of patent applications with patent awards 
with a three-year lag  ^ shows that on average 70 per cent of patent applications survived 
patent examination (see details in Table 5.1). The 30 per cent failure rate can be explained 
mainly by the institutional deficiency of a newly established patent system and the 
limited number of specialised patent agents.
1 The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China and the rules for its implementation came into 
effect in 1985. In order to bring the level of China’s patent protection closer to international standards, the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted an amendment to the Patent Law on 
September 4* , 1992. According to Ma Lianyuan, deputy director of Chinese Patent Office, these revisions 
helped bring Chinese regulations in line with current international standards regarding patent protection 
(Huang Wei, 1992, pl4).
 ^A study done by Taylor and Silberston (1973) on the economic impact of the patent system showed that 
"most applications take from one and half to two and half years before publication" for grant.
Table 5.1 Patent Applications Examined and Certified:
A Comparison: 1985 - 1997'
Particular 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997
Patent
Examined (a) 
Patent
14,372 26,077 34,011 32,905 41,469 50,040 77,735 83,045 102,735 114,208
Awarded (b) 138 6,811 11,947 17,129 22,588 24,616 43,297 45,064 43,780 50,992
Dif(c)=(a)-(b) 14,234 19,266 22,064 15,776 18,881 25,424 34,438 37,981 58,955 63,216
(b)/(a) 0.47 0.83'’ 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.86' 0.90'* 0.56 0.61
Notes: a. The number o f patent applications examined and awarded are composed of patent applications 
of inventions, utility models and designs by both domestic and foreign applicants.
b. Due to the lack of 1986 data on patent applications, 1988 patent applications awarded is compared to 
1985 patent applications.
c. 1994 patent applications awarded is compared to 1991 patent applications examined.
d. 1995 patent applications awarded is compared to 1991 patent applications examined.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China: 1992, Tables 18-72 and 18-73, pp760-l. Statistical Yearbook of 
China: 1997, Tables 18-58 and 18-59, pp692-3. Statistical Yearbook of China: 1998, Tables 20-57 and 20- 
58, pp736-7.
Applicant-Specific data reveals some differences in patenting behaviour among 
different applicants. Universities and research units, affiliated to industrial ministries, 
played a leading role in the national innovation system during the pre-reform period and 
they also fared well in terms of patent applications in the post reform period. In 
comparison, enterprises were mainly considered as production units, and had relatively 
limited resources and incentives to engage in large scale R&D activities; thus, they 
accounted for only a small proportion of the total patent applications.
China Statistical Yearbook 1998 shows that in 1997 universities and research units 
accounted for 14 per cent of the total patent applications for invention but had the 37 per 
cent of the awards. Enterprises made 2,239 applications, of which only 170 were 
awarded. Table 5.2 shows that with a 3-year lag, the award ratio went up by 7 percentage 
points for universities and research units and 8  percentage points for enterprises.
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Table 5.2 Patent Applications Examined and Awarded: 1985 - 97
A comparison by Applicant
Applicant 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997
l.a. Domestic invention
Universities* Examined 0 553 648 562 509 718 654 574 604 635
Awarded 18 119 208 320 326 295 285 258 228 256
Ratio 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.44
Research Units’* Examined 0 716 777 689 805 831 969 865 1036 1262
Awarded 11 108 209 362 331 365 354 304 247 316
Ratio 0.51 0.43 0.53 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.36
Enterprises' Examined 0 564 568 595 816 958 815 1086 1725 2239
Awarded 3 33 67 167 206 217 231 205 187 170
Ratio 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.15
Organisations'* Examined 0 224 267 311 352 546 1147 468 123 112
Awarded 0 3 14 33 45 60 165 165 163 170
Ratio 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.36
Individual' Examined 1520 1918 2520 2592 3350 4319 7606 7025 7983 8465
Awarded 6 48 119 201 241 374 624 598 558 620
Ratio 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.08
b. Foreign Invention
Examined 4493 4084 4872 4910 4305 4051 7876 11618 17046 20953
Awarded 2 111 408 1220 2689 2811 2224 1863 1593 1962
Ratio 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.45 0.20 0.16
Notes: a. Including polytechnics;
b. No footnotes given to show the ownership of research units; therefore, they may consist of 
govemment-run units;
c. The ownership and size of enterprises are not clear;
d. Non-production organisations;
e. Non-professionals.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China: 1992, Tables 18-72 and 18-73, pp760-l. Statistical Yearbook of 
China: 1997, Tables 18-58 and 18-59, pp692-3. Statistical Yearbook of China: 1998, Tables 20-57 and 20- 
58, pp736-7.
Several issues need to be addressed with regard to enterprise patenting activity. 
During the early years of the enforcement of China's Patent Law, only 3 and 33 patents 
were granted to enterprises in 1985 and 1987. This can be attributed to several factors: (1) 
the old S&T management system, (2) belated development of China's patent system, (3) 
underdeveloped patent agencies, and (4) the procedure of patent granting. Compared with 
the patent systems in other countries, especially developed market economies with long
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patent history^, Western style patent system was only introduced into China during 
China's industrialisation in the first half of the 20th century. The development was 
interrupted in 1949 when the communist took over. The institutional structure for law 
enforcement only started taking shape gradually from 1985, thus institutional deficiency 
will inevitably affect the enforcement of the Patent Law. And the nature of patent 
granting procedure necessitates a long period from patent application to issue.
5.2 Patent statistics in studies of market structure and innovation
Patent statistics have long been used by economists as a measure of inventive 
activity. Jacob Schmookler (1966) showed that patenting activity in various industries 
and at various times was correlated with the pressure of demand for products. His 
research has been described as
'...so rich and so suggestive that it has to be the starting point for future attempts to 
deal with economics of inventive activity and its relationship to economic growth' (N. 
Rosenberg, 1974).
In a well known study Scherer (1965), using a sample of 448 US manufacturing 
firms drawn from the 'Fortune 500' list, found a significant correlation between the 
number of patents awarded to a firm and firm size (measured by sales or net assets). 
However, the patent intensity (patents per dollar of sales) was found decline as firm size 
increased in most industries.
^For example, the patent system as a reward mechanism for encouraging genuine innovations and 
protecting inventor's interests took shape as early as the 15th century and many examples o f privileges 
granted to innovators occurred even before the 15th century (Gomme, 1946, pp5-13).
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Subsequently Comanor and Scherer (1969) compared three measures of innovative 
activity: sales of new products within two years after introduction, the number of R&D 
personnel, and the number of patents received. For a sample of 57 pharmaceutical firms 
they found that, given the firm size, the correlations between the three measures were 
positive and statistically significant.
Smyth, Samuels, and Tzoannos (1972) study of eighty-six United Kingdom firms in 
chemicals, electrical engineering and electronics, and machine tools, found that during 
1963 - 6 6  large firms were more likely to be involved in patenting than small firms were. 
In the chemical industry the number of patents awarded increased more than 
proportionately with size; and that was also the case for all but the largest firms within 
the electrical engineering and electronics industries. However, in the machine tool 
industry patenting decreased with firm size.
In an alternative approach Johannisson and Lindstrom (1971) used the number of 
patent applications made by 181 Swedish firms with over five hundred employees in 
twelve industries. Patent applications increased faster than firm size in the chemical 
industry but less than proportionately in the engineering and metal manufacturers. In 
comparison, Schwartzman (1976) found that regardless of the way in which they were 
measured, inventive efforts in the U.S. drug industry increased more than proportionately 
with firm size. He claimed that this could be because large firms enjoyed substantial 
economies of scale in R&D.
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Although the literature on innovation has continued to expand and has been reviewed 
by various writers, Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Griliches (1984), Scherer (1986) and 
Basberg (1987), very little is known about firm's innovative efforts in less developed 
economies. Using panel data of 145 firms in Indian plastic-chemicals and engineering 
sectors for the period 1975-6 to 1979-80 Deolalikar and Roller (1989) estimated the 
probability of patenting in Indian firms and they found that the probability of patenting 
was influenced by a firm's R&D manpower, measured by the number of employees with 
Ph.D. and B.Sc. degrees, but not by the value of fixed assets. Their tests controlled for 
unobserved fixed firm effects such as good management.
5.3 Empirical Analyses
This section builds upon the above mentioned studies to analyse the factors influencing 
patenting amongst Chinese enterprises
5.3.1 Testing procedure
Logit regression of the following form was used
In(P/)=Po+Piln(SAL/)+P2hi(NUM/)+p3ln(NUMB85/)+p4ln(PRONUM)+u, (1) 
where Py is a dichotomous variable, taking the value 1  if an enterprise had patents and 0  
otherwise. SAL, NUM, NUMB 8  5 and PRONUM are as defined in previous chapters and 
Uy is an error term.
Since equation (1) is specified in logarithmic form, the coefficients of explanatory 
variables can be interpreted directly as propensities to patent with respect to firm size and 
characteristics of technology transfer. We expect that p^  > 0, implying that large
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enterprises are more likely to patent their inventions and innovations; 0 , implies that 
enterprises with more technological collaboration agreements are more likely to patent, P3  
> 0 , will indicate that enterprises with technological agreements before 1985 are more 
likely to patent and P4  > 0 , implies that diversifying enterprises are more likely to patent.
Our regression analyses of the impact of enterprise size on the probability of 
patenting will be conducted using both sales and the number of employees to see which 
indicate produces better results. As an alternative to the R&D expenditures, as a measure 
of inputs, we also collected data on the number of engineers and technicians employed. 
Both sets of data are used in our regression analyses.
5.3.2 Patent Statistics and Basic Data on Enterprises
Patent statistics, which were collected through questionnaire survey, are summarised in 
Table C.5 in Appendix C. For the 1985 - 91 period, 33 out of the 95 enterprises surveyed 
had at least one patent and together they possessed a total of 144 patents. In general, our 
survey formed a similar pattern as that reported by China’s State Statistical Bureau, 
namely only a few patents granted in the first three years since the establishment of 
China’ patent system and a steady increase since 1987.
A limitation of our tests is that it is not possible to tell from our data whether the 
patents are for major or minor innovations, though the latter is more likely for China's 
industrial enterprises. Nor do we have much information on the commercialisation of the
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patents awarded. Hence, we do not know the economic significance of the reported patent 
data.
Sales and the number of employees are two alternative measures of enterprise 
size. Due to the difficulties that enterprises encountered when evaluating assets, we 
deliberately omitted question on enterprise assets, although they can be used alternatively 
as a third measure of enterprise size.
It is argued that sales, the number of employees and assets are positively but not 
perfectly correlated (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). We tested the relationship between 
sales and the number of employees for which we had data. It turns out that the correlation 
coefficient is 0.59598 or 0.60.^ Our statistical result supports the argument that sales and 
the number of employees are positively but not perfectly correlated. Our regression 
analyses on the impact of enterprise size on the probability of patenting will be conducted 
by both sales and the number of employees to see which indicator produces better results.
Since R&D expenditures as a measure of inputs into the innovation process do not 
reflect the composition of the inputs, we also collected data on the number of engineers 
and technicians. However, it is impossible for us to refine the number of engineers and 
technicians because we do not have data on the distribution of experience of engineers 
and technicians, indicated either by their salaries^ or by work experiences. Both R&D
 ^ The significance of the correlation coefficient, r, was tested by Student’s t test. The value of t statistic 
was estimated from the sample correlation coefficient by the expression f  = r/n- 2  / 1 -r^  and was compared 
with the theoretical value of ^ 0.025 for two-tailed test at the 5 per cent level of significance with n-2 degree of 
freedom. In our case, the f* = 7.23, which is significantly greater than the theoretical 0^.025 = 2.00 with 93 
degrees of freedom, so we conclude that the correlation coefficient, 0.59598, or 0.60 is significant at the 5 
per cent level with 93 degrees of freedom.
 ^Even if we had collected data on salary, we would not be sure that salary could reflect the difference in 
qualification, performance, length of service, etc. to a satisfactory extent.
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expenditures and the number of engineers and technicians are used in our regression 
analyses.
5.4 The Empirical Results
The regression results for the endogenous variable, P, are reported in Table 5.3. 
Generally, the test results are quite satisfactory. In(SAL) performed well in all three 
equations with a positive sign, suggesting that the probability that an enterprise has patent 
rises with the increase in sales. In general enterprises with imported technologies have 
high propensity to patent, as shown by the positive sign of ln(NUM), as do the enterprises 
diversifying into other products, but technological collaboration agreements effected 
before 1985 had no effect on enterprise patenting behaviour (perhaps for the reasons 
discussed in Section 5.1)
Table 5.3 Logit analysis Explaining Enterprise Patenting Behaviour*
Equation Coefficient T-ratio
(1) Constant .178 2.485*
LogSAL .106 3.346*
(2) Constant .164 2.362*'
LogSAL .083 2.583*
LogNUM .055 2.677*
(S)Constant .072 0.910
LogSAL .068 2.070"
LogNUM .056 1.678°
LGNMB85 -.001 -.026
LGPRONUM .140 2.159"
*The regressions are based on data on 95 enterprises in China's machine building industry. T-ratios marked 
a, b, and c indicate at, at least, 1,5, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
LogSAL = logarithm of SAL;
LogNUM = logarithm of number of technological collaboration agreements;
LGNMB85 = LogNUM x B85;
LGPRONUM = logarithm of number of products.
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Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion
Economic liberalisation and its main feature, open-door policy , have intensified 
technology acquisition in various forms and led to diversified sources of technology 
supply. The trend of china’s technology imports is still upwards. The first half of 1998 
saw the registration of a further 9,196 foreign funded enterprises with a total 
investment of US$28,820 million (China Industrial and Commercial Daily, 1998). 
Technology acquisition will still be an important way for China to enhance its 
indigenous technological capabilities.
6.1 Main research issues and findings
Chapter 1 in this study briefly described China’s economic reforms, and particularly 
its technology policy and machine-building industry. Chapter 2 dealt with technology 
transfer by using secondary data fi*om a historical point of view. The analyses of 
China’s technology imports revealed changes in the transfer mechanism, diversified 
sources of technology imports and a general improvement of national technological 
capabilities.
Chapter 3 examined the technological decision-making process of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). We found that the main reasons for their obtaining foreign 
technology are the ‘unavailability’, ‘immaturity’, and ‘low quality’ of local 
technologies. And criteria for choosing between foreign technologies are ‘advanced 
stage’, ‘suitability’ and the ‘reputation of technology supplier’. Logit analyses showed 
that the probability that an enterprise stresses the ‘unavailability’ factor increases 
with enterprise size.
99
Chapter 4 considered the effect of imported technology on SOEs own 
technological efforts. Multiple regression analyses suggested that the imports, 
enterprise size and multi-product production have a positive effect on in-house 
technological efforts. However, larger state-owned industrial enterprises were found 
to be less responsive to market signals for new technology, although they may have 
better R&D facilities.
Chapter 5 examined whether our findings with respect to enterprises 
technological efforts were also reflected in their technological outputs. The latter were 
inferred fi*om the patent statistics. The regression results showed that large and 
diversified enterprises and those using imported technologies also fared well in 
patenting.
6.2 Future Research Areas
Two decades have passed since the economic reforms started in 1978. Government 
interventions in enterprises economic activities have largely been replaced by market 
forces. These changes have led to further areas for studying enterprises’ technological 
decisions. Three of the areas may be mentioned. First, similar studies may be 
undertaken for the state-owned enterprises in other industries. Comparative study 
could take into consideration the differences in the scientific base of various industries 
and the pace of innovative activity in other countries. Secondly, it would be worth 
comparing the technological decisions of the SOEs with those of the non-state-owned 
firms. The latter now contribute nearly three-quarters of the gross industrial output 
value. An overall understanding of the national innovation system would be helped by 
studying both types of enterprises. Thirdly, one can look at the implications of the 
new technologies such as information technology on traditional skills. Do the new
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technologies make traditional skills redundant? Or are new roles opened up for 
traditional skills?
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APPENDIX A. - Questionnaire Survey: A Brief Description
A.1 Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire was drafted in the late 1990. It was composed of four parts: I.
General Information about Enterprises; II. Questions on Choice of Technology; III.
Questions on Technology Assimilation and Absorption; IV. Questions on Technology
Diffusion; and V. Questions on Quantitative Data. In view of China’s socio-economic
situation, the draft was designed not to evoke any suspicion in order for the survey to
be conducted successfully.
There were four questions in Part I designed to collect information on an 
enterprise’s name, ownership, administrative affiliation and the year in which it was 
put into production. Part II included 12 questions about technological collaborations 
with foreign technology suppliers, reasons for importing technologies and equipment, 
sources of foreign technological information, criteria on the choice of technologies 
and restrictions on collaboration agreements. To obtain the information on the 
possible effects of imported technologies on enterprise R&D activities, we asked in 
Part III the questions concerning adaptive R&D in general, various particular adaptive 
R&D activities, and objectives of adaptive R&D.
Literature on the Third World countries’ technological capabilities shows that 
the transfer of technology, either created in-house or assimilated, by the firms in the 
Third world can be used as an indicator of their technological capability (Lall, 1984). 
Therefore, we designed 3 questions in Part IV to gain some knowledge on the 
recipients of technologies transferred by Chinese enterprises and transfer mechanisms.
To obtain quantitative data, we asked enterprises to report the number of 
workers, engineers and technicians; qualifications held(eg bachelor, master, and
102
doctor degree); overall and technology-transfer related sales; exports; R&D 
expenditures; payments, may it be lump-sum, royalty, and/or technical service fees, 
made by enterprises; payments made for external domestic technological assistance; 
and main line of products.
A.2 Choice o f  Survey Organisations and Pilot questionnaire Survey
Choice of survey organisations proved to be the most difficult task in the 
survey. As widely known, China was a highly centrally planned economy and one- 
party state. Political control over production units was exercised by grass-root party 
committees. Likewise, central economic plans passed down to enterprises determined 
what to produce, how to produce and for whom to produce. Enterprises, especially 
SOEs, were still shrouded in the past legacy in the late 1980s and early 1990s despite 
the ongoing economic reforms. In view of this, a good response to a questionnaire 
would be obtained by approaching an organisation which had an authority to conduct 
official surveys. The best candidate for this task was China’s State Statistical Bureau 
(SSB). However, this is not without any cost. The price one had to pay was low 
efficiency due to red tape typical of all government agencies.
More market-oriented and non-governmental university-based organisations for 
social and economic investigation were established nation-wide in the late 1980s. 
among them were the Social Research Centre of the People’s University and China 
Survey Services. The nature of these organisations determined their good quality and 
efficiency in conducting surveys on behalf of or in co-operation with their clients. 
However, the non-governmental nature made them lack official and usually powerful 
support, which is always essential in conducting surveys successfully.
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Obviously, when considering survey organisations in 1991, we had no way to 
find an ideal organisation that had an authority over enterprises and no bureaucracy. 
With the belief in government authority over SOEs, we entrusted China Statistical 
Consultation Centre (CSCC), a department of SSB, with our questionnaire survey. 
However, CSCC backed out fi*om an already signed contract because of the collapse 
of the Soviet Communist Party. This forced us to turn to non-governmental survey 
organisations that were less affected by China’s political situation. On July 20 1991, a 
formal contract was signed by our China representative with CSS to conduct the 
questionnaire survey. It was reported that an attempt to obtain official back-up fi*om 
the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry failed due to CSS being unable to agree with 
the Ministry on making some changes to the original questionnaire. The Ministry 
however conducted a random sampling, resulting in 2 0 0  iron and steel enterprises 
being chosen. Together with 40 more iron and steel enterprises sampled by CSS, 240 
out of a population of 1566 establishments, including mining enterprises and research 
institutions in this industry, were chosen. Investigators were trained to guarantee the 
quality of the survey. However, due to the financial difficulty we had, only a few of 
enterprises near Beijing were visited by trained investigators. By October 24, 1991, 50 
questionnaires were received. Of which 30 had technological collaboration 
agreements with foreign companies.
A.3 Formal Questionnaire Survey and Survey Results
Based on the pilot survey, we revised our previous questionnaire by taking into 
consideration the fact that enterprises need to protect themselves, the difficulties in 
finding data covering a long time span and the possible misunderstanding of our 
questions. Consequently, enterprises were allowed not to reveal their names if they
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choose to do so; quantitative data were asked to cover a period of 7  years from 1985 
to 1991 in stead of 13 years from 1979 to 1991; and 16 notes were added to facilitate 
correct understanding of the questions. In addition, the original layout was also 
changed and the number of questions reduced.
Investigators were retrained and more were added to the original team. Two 
thousand enterprises in China’s machine-building industry were randomly selected. 
By the end of 1991, all questionnaires were either delivered by investigators or posted 
to the selected enterprises. By the end of September 1992, 131 questiormaires were 
received, among which 123 SOEs and 8  COEs. The small number of COEs made it 
impossible for us to carry on part of our original plan, i.e. to compare SOEs’ 
technological behaviour with that of COEs.
Using the quantitative data given on R&D outlays and sales revenue as a 
standard, we divided SOEs into two groups: (a) SOEs that provided complete data on 
Q5 and Q6  in Part I and Q5 in Part V, and (b) those that did not do so. Consequently, 
we had 95 out of the 123 SOEs with complete data and 28 incomplete data. Since all 
enterprises answered every qualitative question, the 95 SOEs were finally chosen to 
form our data set.
A.4 Questionnaire 
I General Information
1.1 Please give a) the name of your enterprise
1.2 Please give the ownership of your enterprise (please tick)
a. state-owned
b. collectively owned
c. state joint venture
d. collective joint venture
e. private
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f. private joint venture
g. others (please specify)
1.3 Please give the administrative affiliation of your enterprise (please tick)
a. ministerial
b. provincial
c. municipal
d. local
1.4 Please give the age of your enterprise..................................................................
II Questions on Choice of Technology
2.1 Has your enterprise entered into technology collaboration agreement with a 
foreign company? Yes or No (please tick)
2.2 If yes, please state the total number of agreements entered during the period 1978- 
91.
2.3 Please give the origin of technology suppliers.
2.4 What do your enterprise think are the major criteria in choosing foreign
technology. (iDlease tick)
Criterion Very important Important Fairly important Un-important
Cheapness
Advancement
Suitability
Reputation
Labour
intensity
2.5 Please state the number of foreign technology collaboration agreements with the 
following restrictions (please tick)
a. export restriction
b. re-sale of technology imported
c. tie-in purchase of machinery/equipment
2.6 Please state the number of your foreign technology suppliers with the following 
ownership
a. private
b. state-owned
c. state-private joint venture
d. others (please specify)
2.7 Does your enterprise have formalised system for choosing technology, which 
includes (a) detailed market appraisal, (b) appraisal of various technologies, sellers 
and their terms and conditions, (c) cost-benefit analyses, conducted by R&D 
department?
Yes or No (please tick)
2.8 What does your enterprise think are the major sources of information on 
technology? (please tick)
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Source 1 2 3 4
Factory director's visits abroad 
R&D persormel visits abroad 
Industrial and commercial exhibitions 
Technical consultation 
Professional trade journals 
Technology suppliers
1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 = fairly important, and 4 = unimportant
2.9 Has your enterprise ever acquired indigenous technologies? Yes or No (please 
tick)
2.10 For what purposes does your enterprise import technologies/equipment?
a. to improve production process? Yes or No
b. to introduce new product(s)? Yes or No
c. to complement your own technological capability? Yes or No
d. others (please specify)
2.11 Why does your enterprise choose foreign technology/equipment rather than
Reason 1 2 3 4
No such technology/equipment on domestic market 
Immaturity of domestic technology 
High price of domestic technology/equipment 
Low quality of domestic technology/equipment 
Limited supply of domestic technology/equipment 
Others (please specify)
III Questions on Technology Assimilation and Adaptation
3.1 Does your enterprise conduct adaptive work in assimilating and absorbing 
imported technology/equipment? Yes or No (please tick)
3.2 If yes, what does your enterprise do to imported technology/equipment?
a. to adjust imported technology/equipment for local materials?
b. to adapt products to local demand conditions?
c. to scale down/up imported technology?
d. to adapt technology to the work habit of local workforce?
3.3 Does your enterprise undertake formal R&D? Yes or No (please tick)
3.4 If yes, please state the main objectives of your R&D (please tick)
a. to substitute import
b. to develop new product(s)
c. to improve production process
d. others ( please specify)
IV Questions on Technology Diffusion
4.1 Has your enterprise ever transferred technology to other enterprises? Yes or No. 
(please tick)
4.2 If yes, please tick the following
a. domestic state-owned enterprises
b. domestic collectively owned enterprises
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c. firm in other developing countries
d. firms in developed countries
e. others (please specify)
1 2 3 4
Free transfer
sale of technology 
Licensing agreement 
Subcontracting
1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 = fairly important, and 4 = unimportant 
V Questions on Quantitative Data
5.1 Please report the following data for your enterprise's activities by giving annual 
average figures for the period 1978 to 1991.
a. overall R&D expenditures of your enterprise
b. overall sales of your enterprise
c. overall R&D expenditures for each technology collaboration agreement
d. sales of the product(s) made as a result of each agreement
e. overall export of your company's products
f. exports of products under each agreement
5.2 Please report the following data on your enterprise's workforce for the period 
1978 to 1991
a. Total number of workers and staff members, among whom
1. number of engineers
2 . number of technicians
3. number of skilled workers
4. number of semi-skilled workers
5. number of unskilled workers
6 . number of administrative staff
7. number of workers having doctoral degree
8 . number of workers having master degree
9. number of workers having bachelor degree
1 0 . number of workers having no degree but university graduates
1 1 . number of workers who are graduates of technical schools
1 2 . number of workers who are graduates of senior middle schools
13. number of workers who are junior middle school graduates
14. number of workers who are graduates of spare time education
15. number of workers who have no education at all
b. Total number of workers and staff members in R&D department, among 
whom
1 . number of engineers
2 . number of technicians
3. number of skilled workers
4. number of semi-skilled workers
5. number of unskilled workers
6 . number of doctor degree holders
7. number of master degree holders
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8 . number of bachelor degree holders
c. Total number of workers and administrative staff sent to foreign technology 
supplier for training
d. Total number of technical personnel accompanying each technology 
transfer
5.3 Please report the following data on your enterprise for the period 1978 to 1991
a. number of patent applications
b. number of patents awarded
c. number of new products related to technology collaboration agreements
d. number of new products not related to any agreements
e. number of innovations awarded by the state
5.4 Please give the following data on your enterprise for the period 1978 to 1991
a. Expenditures on hiring outside domestic scientists and technicians
b. Expenditures on government laboratories used
c. Payments for the use of domestic educational institutes
d. Payments for the technical consultancy from other enterprises
e. Payments for the technical services of foreign technology suppliers
5.5 Please report the data on your enterprise for the period 1978 to 1991
a. number of technology transfer by your enterprise each year
b. total value of each transfer of that year
c. recipients of your technology that year
5.6 Please state the following expenditures incurred by your enterprise with regards to 
each technology collaboration agreement. Please give armual average figure for the 
period 1978 to 1991.
a. lump-sum payments made for each imported technology
b. the short-term royalty paid for each imported technology
c. the long-term royalty paid for each imported technology
d. other payments (please specify and give figures)
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APPENDIX B. - Questionnaire Survey: Raw Data
-1991
Firm Average sales 
value 
RMB’000,000
Average R&D 
expenditures 
RMB’000,000
Average 
number of 
employees
Average 
number of 
engineers and 
technicians
Year an SOE 
put into 
production
1 30.05 0.15 677.29 63.00 1962
2 29.88 0.13 1045.43 56.86 n/a
3 124.66 0.64 5100.57 151.14 n/a
4 242.52 1.82 12320.00 1413.71 1951
5 35.13 2.23 1157.86 428.14 1956
6 320.56 0 . 2 1 3403.86 660.14 1958
7 104.95 3.93 6155.43 483.71 1951
8 50.74 2.37 2517.90 386.00 n/a
9 466.46 2.85 18222.29 3282.57 n/a
1 0 8.40 0.17 648.57 249.86 1968
1 1 185.18 0.05 3303.71 56.86 1949
1 2 17.77 0.19 1085.43 113.86 1958
13 28.46 0 . 1 2 979.14 23.29 1963
14 169.37 0.18 9482.00 330.57 1979
15 41.52a 0.73a 2558.14 205.50b 1958
16 450.72 0.43 12168.14 946.29 1935
17 133.15c 0.41c 2325.14 106.43 n/a
18 12.43 0.04 667.50d 54.00d 1965
19 153.58 21.15 1114.43 83.14 n/a
2 0 564.22 0.58 8549.70 98.57 1949
2 1 417.38 0.64 3190.57 398.86 1973
2 2 7.24 0 . 0 1 283.00 20.14 1958
23 30.15 0.08 1889.71 171.29 1956
24 5.40 0.06 451.86 27.29 1959
25 28.26 0.26 2019.00 235.14 1980
26 51.81 0.49 3209.29 135.57 1928
27 176.37 0.72 3421.29 379.71 n/a
28 28.71 0.29 871.14 97.00 1970
29 37.60 0.30 1 2 1 2 . 0 0 126.14 1934
30 33.56 0 . 2 2 1086.86 118.43 1969
31 37.63 0.31a 2722.71 95.86 1974
32 10.44 0.16 1166.14 318.57 1958
33 44.24 0.25d 1572.57 81.00 1956
34 125.72 8.34 4779.30 1982.14 n/a
35 102.54 3.29a 1133.71 459.40e 1986
36 145.56 0.07 2655.20c 109.75b 1985
37 137.60 1.57 1383.14 160.43 1970
38 281.01 0.57 8849.50a 774.57 1949
39 63.40 11.06 5536.71 558.29 1958
40 199.38 0 . 1 0 9166.43 107.14 1956
41 11.35 0.15 797.00 106.29 1966
42 291.01 0.52 10497.00 1098.86 1954
43 188.00 1.38 16960.86 1706.00a n/a
44 85.46 0.52 3136.14 69.43f 1950
45 93.16 0.04 2494.14 139.86 n/a
46 274.10 0.80 2062.71 136.00b n/a
47 120.54 0.64 2261.14 57.00g 1965
48 7.74 0 . 0 1 505.71 46.86 1966
49 5.26 0.06 510.14 42.29 n/a
50 106.21 0 . 1 2 871.86 45.00g 1981
51 102.03 0.38 3299.86 260.57 n/a
52 1269.22 3.33 12273.57 605.71 1983
53 104.29 7.49 3572.71 246.57 n/a
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Table B.l (continued)
54 3.99 0 . 0 2 836.00 42.29 n/a
55 182.34 1.60 4075.86 171.71 1952
56 6.44 0 . 0 1 819.86 79.29 1957
57 9.19 0.09 1184.29 300.43 1969
58 623.20 1.90 1886.71 306.43 1956
59 17.93 0.04 2150.57 19.43 1949
60 2.32 0.09 507.14 38.14 n/a
61 51.13 0.19 1439.29 225.71 1955
62 10.96 0.16 1187.71 155.43 1958
63 1017.84 3.08 9466.57 436.86 1986
64 676.46 3.18 9265.86 842.71 1950
65 97.21 0.04 5723.00 1044.71 n/a
6 6 12.92 0 . 1 0 878.00g 53.00g 1949
67 52.00 0.18 668.14 15.14 1950
6 8 10.16 0.08 465.71 60.14 1965
69 124.81 1.51h 1237.29 58.50b 1981
70 58.73 0.14 1929.00 126.71 1973
71 34.87 0.44 2852.43 183.57 n/a
72 191.88 1.72 2194.71 66.43 1952
73 108.96 0 . 0 1 6973.14 133.86 1959
74 49.43d 0.64i 899.67d 40.50d 1979
75 22.63 0 . 0 1 1226.86 15.43 1958
76 20.84 1.15 1648.71 258.71 1959
77 224.93 1.92 9058.29 779.71 1949
78 23.07 0.19 2452.43 818.57 1955
79 236.00 0.76 1678.14 109.71 1979
80 855.83 4.84 3233.57 204.14 n/a
81 4.11 0 . 0 1 662.00 32.14 1958
82 209.56 0.35 6265.00 209.29 n/a
83 49.37 0.24 1261.00 115.14 1958
84 103.89 0 . 2 2 2217.00 143.43 1957
85 295.46 0.78 7855.00 905.57 n/a
8 6 3.67 0.03J 800.57 67.71 n/a
87 4.59 0 . 0 2 2629.57 233.29 n/a
8 8 9.22 0.04 2215.57 198.00 n/a
89 5.46 0.17 2061.29 1 1 1 . 8 6 1961
90 38.52 2.58 4093.71 471.00 1949
91 284.44 0.09d 1178.14 68.14 1958
92 7.42 0 . 0 2 648.71 32.00 1980
93 37.62 0.09 3742.71 976.29 1954
94 6.35 0.14 611.00 66.57 1962
95 64.80 0.99 2383.00 175.57 n/a
Source: questionnaire survey data, 1992. 
Notes: a. six-year average from 1986 to 1991;
b. four-year average from 1988 to 1991;
c. five-year average from 1987 to 1991;
d. six-year average from 1985 to 1990;
e. five-year average from 1986 to 1990;
f. engineers only;
g.l991 figure only;
h. three-year average from 1989 to 1991;
i. four-year average from 1987 to 1990; 
j. three-year average from 1988 to 1990.
I l l
Table B.2 Reasons for Choosing Foreign Technology
Reason
Firm Unavailability Immaturity High Price Lower
Quality
Short
Supply
1 1 1 3 1 3
2 2 1 4 2 4
3 2 1 4 1 4
4 1 1 2 2 2
5 1 1 3 2 3
6 1 4 4 4 4
7 1 2 3 1 2
8 1 1 4 4 4
9 1 1 4 2 3
1 0 1 1 4 4 4
1 1 1 2 4 3 3
1 2 1 1 4 4 4
13 2 1 4 1 4
14 1 1 4 4 4
15 1 4 4 2 4
16 1 2 3 2 4
17 2 1 3 1 3
18 1 4 4 4 4
19 2 2 4 2 4
2 0 1 2 3 2 4
2 1 1 1 3 1 4
2 2 3 2 3 1 4
23 1 1 4 1 4
24 1 1 4 1 4
25 1 4 4 2 4
26 1 1 4 1 3
27 1 2 2 1 2
28 1 2 3 2 3
29 1 2 4 4 4
30 1 2 4 2 4
31 1 2 4 3 4
32 4 2 4 2 4
33 2 2 3 4 4
34 1 3 3 1 4
35 1 2 4 2 4
36 1 4 4 4 4
37 1 1 3 2 2
38 1 2 4 2 4
39 2 1 3 2 3
40 1 2 4 2 2
41 1 1 1 1 1
42 1 2 4 3 4
43 1 1 1 1 1
44 2 4 4 4 4
45 2 4 4 4 4
46 1 2 4 4 4
47 2 2 4 1 4
48 4 1 4 2 3
49 1 1 4 2 4
50 4 1 4 1 4
51 1 2 2 2 4
52 1 1 3 2 3
53 1 1 4 4 4
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Table B.2 (continued)
54 1 1 2 1 3
55 2 1 4 2 4
56 3 2 1 2 2
57 1 1 3 2 3
58 1 1 2 2 4
59 1 3 3 1 3
60 4 3 4 2 4
61 4 4 4 1 4
62 1 4 2 4 1
63 1 1 4 4 4
64 2 1 4 1 3
65 1 1 3 2 3
6 6 2 2 3 3 3
67 2 1 3 1 3
6 8 1 2 2 2 2
69 1 1 4 4 4
70 4 2 4 4 4
71 1 2 2 2 4
72 2 2 4 4 4
73 1 3 3 1 4
74 1 1 3 2 3
75 1 2 2 2 3
76 2 1 3 1 2
77 1 3 4 2 4
78 2 2 3 3 4
79 4 1 4 1 4
80 1 4 4 4 4
81 2 1 3 3 3
82 3 1 3 3 3
83 1 2 2 3 2
84 2 3 2 4 4
85 1 2 4 4 4
8 6 2 1 3 2 4
87 1 2 4 4 4
8 8 4 1 4 4 4
89 2 2 2 3 3
90 2 4 4 4 3
91 1 4 4 4 4
92 3 2 3 1 4
93 1 4 4 4 4
94 1 2 4 4 4
95 4 1 4 4 4
Note: 1 = very important; 2 = important; 3 = fairly important; 4 = unimportant.
Question 6 : What are the main reasons for your enterprise to import foreign technology and/or 
equipment?
Source: questionnaire survey data, 1992.
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Table B.3 Criteria for Choosing Foreign Technology
Criterion
Firm Cheapness Advancement Suitability Reputation Labour
intensity
1 2 1 1 3 4
2 2 1 1 1 4
3 4 1 2 3 4
4 2 1 2 3 4
5 3 1 1 2 4
6 2 1 1 2 4
7 4 2 2 2 4
8 3 1 1 3 4
9 2 1 1 2 4
1 0 4 2 4 2 4
1 1 3 1 2 2 4
1 2 4 1 2 2 4
13 2 1 2 2 2
14 4 1 2 2 4
15 4 2 4 2 4
16 2 1 2 2 4
17 3 1 1 2 4
18 2 2 2 2 3
19 2 2 4 2 4
2 0 2 2 1 3 3
2 1 1 1 1 3 4
2 2 4 1 2 3 3
23 4 1 2 4 4
24 1 1 1 2 4
25 3 2 1 4 4
26 1 2 1 2 4
27 2 1 1 2 3
28 3 1 2 4 4
29 3 1 2 2 4
30 4 1 2 2 3
31 3 2 1 4 4
32 2 2 2 3 4
33 4 1 4 2 4
34 2 1 1 1 3
35 3 2 1 3 4
36 1 2 3 2 4
37 3 1 2 2 4
38 1 2 2 2 4
39 3 2 1 2 4
40 4 1 2 2 4
41 1 1 1 1 1
42 2 2 1 2 4
43 3 1 1 2 4
44 2 2 1 2 4
45 3 2 2 2 4
46 4 1 3 2 4
47 2 1 2 2 4
48 4 1 2 4 3
49 4 2 4 1 4
50 4 1 2 2 4
51 4 2 1 2 4
52 3 1 1 4 3
53 2 1 1 2 4
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Table B.3 (continued)
54 2 1 1 1 4
55 3 2 1 4 4
56 3 2 1 2 4
57 2 1 2 1 3
58 2 2 1 3 3
59 3 1 2 2 4
60 3 2 2 3 4
61 4 1 2 2 4
62 2 1 2 3 4
63 2 1 2 3 4
64 2 1 2 3 3
65 2 1 2 2 3
6 6 3 2 1 2 4
67 2 2 1 2 3
6 8 3 1 1 1 2
69 1 1 1 2 4
70 2 2 1 2 4
71 2 1 1 2 3
72 4 2 3 3
73 4 1 1 2 4
74 2 1 1 1 2
75 2 1 1 1 2
76 2 2 2 2 3
77 3 1 2 1 4
78 3 2 3 2 4
79 2 1 2 1 4
80 2 1 2 2 4
81 4 2 2 2 4
82 2 2 1 2 4
83 4 2 1 3 4
84 4 2 1 2 4
85 2 1 2 1 4
8 6 3 1 2 2 3
87 3 2 2 2 3
8 8 2 3 1 4 3
89 3 2 3 3 4
90 4 2 4 2 4
91 3 1 4 2 4
92 2 2 1 4 3
93 4 1 1 2 4
94 4 2 1 1 3
95 4 1 1 1 4
Note: 1 = very important; 2 = important; 3 = fairly important; 4 = unimportant.
Question 2: What are the criteria your enterprise use in choosing foreign technology? 
Source: questionnaire survey data, 1992.
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Source
Firm Factory 
director 
visit abroad
R&D 
persormel 
visit abroad
Foreign 
commercial 
& industrial 
exhibitions
Technical
consultation
Trade
journal
Technology
supplier
1 1 1 2 2 2 1
2 4 1 1 2 2 3
3 2 1 3 2 2 1
4 1 1 2 3 3 1
5 1 1 3 2 3 2
6 4 1 3 4 2 1
7 2 1 2 4 4 1
8 1 1 2 2 3 3
9 1 2 2 3 3
10 4 1 4 4 4 4
11 2 1 2 2 2 2
12 1 1 2 2 3 3
13 1 1 2 2 2 2
14 1 1 4 4 4 4
15 4 1 2 2 2 2
16 1 1 2 2 3 2
17 2 1 2 2 2 3
18 2 2 3 1 2
19 1 2 4 4 2
20 4 1 1 4 2 2
21 1 1 2 1 2 2
22 3 2 3 4 1
23 2 1 4 4 4 2
24 2 1 4 4 4 4
25 2 1 4 4 4 4
26 2 2 2 1 3 3
27 2 1 2 2 3 3
28 2 2 2 3 3 3
29 1 2 2 2 3 3
30 1 2 2 2 3 2
31 2 1 3 4 4 4
32 2 2 2 2 2 3
33 2 1 2 3 2 4
34 3 3 3 3 3 3
35 1 1 3 2 3 2
36 1 1 4 2 4 4
37 1 1 2 2 3 3
38 2 1 3 3 4 3
39 4 1 2 2 2 2
40 1 1 2 2 2 2
41 1 1 2 2 2 2
42 2 1 2 2 3 3
43 2 1 2 1 2 2
44 4 4 2 4 2 4
45 4 2 4 4 4 4
46 1 1 3 3 3 3
47 4 3 1 4 2 2
48 3 1 2 4 4 4
49 1 2 2 2 4 4
50 1 1 3 4 4 4
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Table B.4 (continued)
51 1 1 4 2 4 4
52 4 1 4 4 4 4
53 2 1 2 2 2 2
54 2 2 2 1 1 1
55 3 2 2 3 3 2
56 3 2 2 3 2 2
57 2 2 2 1 2 2
58 3 2 2 2 2 1
59 2 1 4 2 2 1
60 3 2 4 3 4 4
61 1 3 3 1 3 3
62 2 2 2 2 3 2
63 1 1 2 3 4 2
64 1 2 3 2 3 2
65 3 2 3 3 2 2
6 6 3 1 2 2 3 2
67 2 1 2 2 3 2
6 8 2 1 1 2 2 1
69 1 4 2 4 4 4
70 2 4 4 4 4 4
71 3 2 1 1 2 2
72 4 1 3 3 4 1
73 4 1 3 3 4 1
74 2 2 1 2 3 2
75 2 1 2 1 2 3
76 4 2 1 2 2 2
77 1 3 3 4 4 3
78 2 2 2 3 3 4
79 2 1 3 3 3 2
80 1 1 2 4 4 2
81 2 2 2 3 3 3
82 2 1 2 2 2 2
83 2 1 2 3 3 2
84 2 1 3 2 3 2
85 2 1 3 3 4 2
8 6 3 2 2 3 3 2
87 2 2 3 4 3 2
8 8 4 4 1 2 4 1
89 2 2 2 2 3 3
90 4 2 4 4 4 4
91 1 2 3 4 4 4
92 3 2 1 3 4 2
93 1 1 4 4 4 1
94 2 3 2 2 2 3
95 4 1 4 4 4 2
Note: 1 = very important; 2 = important; 3 = fairly important; 4 = unimportant.
Question 3: How does your enterprise rank in order of importance the sources of technological 
information?
Source: questiormaire survey data, 1992.
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Appendix C: Patent Statistics
Table C.l Patent Applications Examined: 1985 - 1997*
Applicant 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total applications 14,372 26,077 34,011 32,905 41,469 50,040 77,735 83,045 102,735 114,208
1. a. Domestic invention 4,065 3,975 4,780 4,749 5,832 7,372 11,191 10,018 11,471 12,713
Universities ® 0 553 648 562 509 718 654 574 604 635
Research units ^ 0 716 777 689 805 831 969 865 1,036 1,262
Enterprises ' 0 564 568 595 816 958 815 1,086 1,725 2,239
Organisations * 0 224 267 311 352 546 1,147 468 123 112
Individuals ' 1,520 1,918 2,520 2,592 3,350 4,319 7,606 7,025 7,983 8,465
b. Foreign invention 4,493 4,084 4,872 4,910 4,305 4,051 7,876 11,618 17,046 20,953
2. a. Domestic utility model 5,077 16,605 22,190 20,553 27,488 33,157 45,188 43,429 49,341 49,902
Universities 0 798 848 649 811 975 849 771 711 649
Research units 0 1,110 1,411 1,286 1,521 1,476 1,340 1,376 1,534 1,396
Enterprises 0 2,154 2,435 2,443 3,830 4,172 3,381 4,739 7,544 8,437
Orgainsations 0 755 993 1,019 1,262 1,786 3,600 1,841 404 293
Individuals 3,366 11,788 16,503 15,156 20,064 24,748 36,018 34,702 39,148 39,127
b. Foreign utility model 97 101 210 174 127 125 323 312 263 227
3. a. Domestic design 269 1,083 1,612 2,065 3,265 4,866 11,428 15,433 21,395 27,456
Universities 0 9 17 9 13 11 17 18 5 9
Research units 0 18 30 40 64 78 231 104 265 171
Enterprises 0 360 513 687 1,310 1,890 2,672 6,031 11,032 14,793
Organisations 0 87 158 183 326 631 3,131 2,040 147 22
Individuals 192 609 894 1,146 1,552 2,256 5,377 7,240 9,946 12,461
b. Foreign design 371 229 347 454 452 469 1,729 2,235 3,219 2,957
* 1985 statistics is for the period from April 1985.
Notes: a. Including polytechnics;
b. No footnotes given to show the ownership of research units; therefore, these research units 
may consist of govemment-mn and non-govemment run units;
c. The ownership and size of enterprises are not clear;
d. Non-production organisations;
e. non-professional inventors/innovators.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1992, Table 18-72, p760.
Statistical Yearbook of China 1997, Table 18-57, p691.
Statistical Yearbook of China 1998, Table 20-57, p736.
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Table C.2 Patent Applications Awarded: 1985 - 1997*
Applicant 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total applications 138 6,811 11,947 17,129 22,588 24,616 43,297 45,064 43,780 50,992
1. a. Domestic invention 38 311 617 1,083 1,149 1,311 1,659 1,530 1,383 1,532
Universities “ 18 119 208 320 326 295 285 258 228 256
Research units 11 108 209 362 331 365 354 304 247 316
Enterprises ® 3 33 67 167 206 217 231 205 187 170
Organisations ^ 0 3 14 33 45 60 165 165 163 170
Individuals ' 6 48 119 201 241 374 624 598 558 620
b. Foreign invention 2 111 408 1,220 2,689 2,811 2,224 1,863 1,593 1,962
2. a.Domestic utility model 56 5,677 10,114 13,373 16,744 17,200 32,611 30,195 26,961 27,185
Universities 21 322 594 731 698 638 786 623 611 511
Research units 6 511 849 1,120 1,280 1,255 1,126 1,025 1,029 962
Enterprises 5 844 1,633 2,149 2,249 2,708 3,172 2,627 3,435 4,601
Organisations 0 81 227 463 873 1,038 2,503 2,491 1,318 490
Individuals 24 3,119 6,811 8,910 11,644 11,561 25,024 23,429 20,568 20,621
b. Foreign utility model 4 91 77 135 208 127 208 276 210 153
3. a. Domestic design 17 413 562 1,024 1,411 2,667 5,507 9,523 11,381 17,672
Universities 0 2 3 19 7 16 7 10 15 7
Research units 2 5 13 19 35 49 34 156 111 194
Enterprises 3 167 223 471 598 1,120 1,581 2,554 5,035 10,239
Organisations 0 3 15 25 111 307 1,347 2,624 1,376 116
Individuals 12 236 308 490 660 1,175 2,538 4,179 4,844 7,116
b. Foreign design 21 208 169 294 387 500 1,088 1,677 2,252 2,488
* 1985 statistics is for the period from April 1®‘, 1985.
Notes: a. Including polytechnics;
b. No footnotes given to show the ownership of research units; therefore, these research units 
may consist of govemment-run and non-govemment run units;
c. The ownership and size of enterprises are not clear;
d. Non-production organisations;
e. Non-professional inventors/innovators.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1992, Table 18-73, p761.
Statistical Yearbook of China 1997, Table 18-58, p692.
Statistical Yearbook of China 1998, Table 20-58, p737.
119
Table C.3 Patent Applications Examined by Country: 1997
Patent Applications Granted by Country: 1997
Coiintrv T ot.al Invention TTtilitv Desi cm
Total 32.415 21.944 5.642 4.829
(9,573) (2 ,0 2 2 ) (3,310) (4,341)
Japan 8,395 6,931 64 1,400
(1,864)* (594)* (45)* (1,225)
Malaysia 2 2 9 3 1 0
(7)* ( 1 ) (0 )* (6 )
Singapore 58 15 1 42
(25) ( 1 ) (2 ) (2 2 )
Thailand 7 1 1 5
(2 ) (0 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
Hongkong 802 60 98 644
(726) (9) (27) (690)
Macao 5 0 2 3
(2 ) (0 ) (0 ) (2 )
Taiwan 7,476 931 5,317 1,228
(4,244) (51) (3,130) (1,163)
South Korea 2,083 1,919 56 108
Cyprus
(182)
2
(61)
2
(39) (82)
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
Sri Lanka 3 1 0 2
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
India 13 13 0 0
(1 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
Monaco 1 1 0 0
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
South Africa 18 18 0 0
(5) (2 ) (0 ) (3)
Germany 2,228 2,059 16 153
(263) (177) (8 ) (78)
Holland 670 585 2 83
(174) (81) ( 1 ) (92)
England 702 595 4 103
(129) (74) (6 ) (49)
Switzerland 767 6 6 6 4 97
(236) (91) (0 ) (145)
Denmark 154 145 1 8
(13) (7) (0 ) (6 )
Hungary 1 0 9 1 0
(3) (3) (0 ) (0 )
Austria 1 2 2 113 0 9
(19) ( 1 2 ) ( 1 ) (6 )
Belgium 103 82 0 2 1
(31) (13) ( 1 ) (17)
France 1,016 877 3 136
(256) (125) (4) (127)
Norway 69 64 0 5
(8 ) (8 ) (0 ) (0 )
Former USSR 38 38 0 0
(2 ) (2 ) (0 ) (0 )
Luxembourg 1 0 7 0 3
(8 ) . (4) (0 ) (4)
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Table C.3 (continued)
Liechtenstein 2 1 2 0 0 1
(3) (3) (0 ) (0 )
Spain 41 39 2 0
(5) (2 ) (2 ) ( 1 )
Yugoslavia 1 1 0 0
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
Czechoslovakia 3 3 0 0
(2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) (0 )
Poland 5 5 0 0
( 1 ) ( 1 ) (0 ) (0 )
Ireland 23 2 2 0 1
(2 ) (2 ) (0 ) (0 )
Finland 269 251 0 18
(43) (2 0 ) ( 1 ) (2 2 )
Bulgaria 2 2 0 0
(2 ) (0 ) (0 ) (2 )
Italy 385 325 7 53
(71) (45) (5) (2 1 )
Sweden 413 377 2 34
(83) (37) (0 ) (46)
Israel 57 49 1 7
( 1 1 ) (4) (0 ) (7)
Panama. 1 0 1 0 0 0
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
Brazil 1 2 1 1 0 1
(3) (3) (0 ) (0 )
The United States 5,919 5,263 42 614
(1,044) (535) (31) (478)
Canada 190 176 5 9
(33) (2 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 0 )
Australia 182 163 1 18
(46) (24) (3) (19)
New Zealand 19 18 0 1
..............(9)....... (3) (0 ) ______ (m.
Source: Statistical Year Book of China, 1998, Table 20-60, p739.
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Table C.4 Distribution of Number of Patents Awarded: 1985 -1991
Firm .......1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
1. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 6 7 0 0 1 14
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
8 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 5
9 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 4
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
11 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
20 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
28 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 0 0 2 6 2 1 11
39 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
41 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
42 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
43 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
44 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
47 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
52 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table C.4 (continued)
55 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 0 0 0 2 2 0 3 7
6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 4
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 0 0 0 7 3 2 25 37
8 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 0 2 8 1 4 2 0 17
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 4 15 26 26 2 2 50 144
Source: questionnaire survey data: 1992.
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